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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Identifying the humanness of a particular user of a Web page is crucial.  Web robots consume 
valuable bandwidth and perform automated actions, such as repeated attempts to log in to user 
accounts.  Studies suggest the Web robot to human ratio is as high as 10:1 regarding the number 
of sessions opened on a Web server; and as high as 4:1 concerning bandwidth consumed on a 
particular Web server [1]. 
This thesis explores the distinctions between humans and robots and the unique interactions 
between humans and Web forms.  The exploration defines Web robots and their uses, the behaviors 
of different agents, traffic analysis between human and non-human robots, and various 
identification mechanisms.  This research also evaluates the differences between humans and 
robots, and differences between multiple human actors.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Web Robots  
There are two classifications of Web robots: non-malicious and malicious.  Most current research 
identifies Web robots based on Web-browsing patterns and resource requests.  There has been 
little research concerning how robots interact with Web forms.  A later section of this thesis 
analyzes collected data that details the interactions between Web robots and Web forms.   
2.1.1 Non-Malicious Robots 
Non-malicious Web robots normally take the form of a Web crawler; a robot that traverses Web 
pages searching for pieces of information.  There are several sub-classifications of Web crawlers.  
These classifications include indexer, verifier, harvester, scraper, RSS crawler, experimental, and 
unknown types [2].   
2.1.1.1 Indexer 
Indexer robots create a map of the Internet.  These robots follow objects defined in a Website’s 
robots.txt and links to create the map. 
2.1.1.2 Verifier 
Verifier robots verify or validate a set of functionality or rules of Web pages.  Several examples 
of verification are HTML verification, broken link detection, accessibility compliance, and quality 
assurance testing. 
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2.1.1.3 Harvester 
Harvester robots do what their name implies; harvest content on Web pages.  These types of 
crawlers request resources such as images and documents. 
2.1.1.4 Scraper 
Scraper robots save requested HTML files.  Malicious and non-malicious users purpose the saved 
data for their own means.  Malicious purposes include the gathering of email addresses for an 
attempt to break into a Web page.  Non-malicious purposes include gathering data for language 
analysis and deep learning. 
2.1.1.5 RSS Crawler 
RSS crawlers keep up-to-date information from various RSS feeds.  This crawler is often on a 
schedule and refreshes the RSS feeds periodically. 
2.1.1.6 Experimental 
Experimental crawlers use a set of combined techniques to map, verify, or harvest data on the 
Web.  These are naturally used for research or experimental purposes, hence the name 
Experimental crawler. 
2.1.1.7 Unknown 
Other Web crawlers exist, however the function of these are outside of the scope of this thesis. 
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2.1.2 Malicious Robots 
Various robot types exhibit malicious intent.  Malicious users automate tasks that take significant 
time for a human to perform, increasing the efficacy of an attack.  Some examples of malicious 
robots include those that destroy or disrupt an online service. 
2.1.2.1 Destructive 
Destructive robots can cause harm to a Web server by performing operations such as filling up the 
hard disk, registering many invalid users to take over the user-base, or exploit mechanisms of a 
business for financial gain. 
2.1.2.2 Disruptive 
Some disruptive robots prevent Web servers from serving pages to legitimate users.  A Denial of 
Service attack prevents access to Web content by causing a Web server to execute too many I/O 
requests, or floods a network with requests.     
Spam robots are another form of disruptive robot.  These robots generate information on an online 
Web application, or send unwanted emails to an end user.  The percentage of traffic that spam 
robots generate has decreased over the previous years [3].   
2.1.3 Distribution of Robots 
Web robots account for most Web traffic, accounting for up to 61.5% of all Web traffic on the 
Internet [3].  While Web crawlers are accountable for 20% to 31% of global Web traffic, 
independent Web sites may see 50% or more of their own traffic generated by Web crawlers [3] 
[4] [5].  Malicious robots account for as much as 5% of Internet traffic. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of traffic by robots.  There are few resources that specify the 
distribution of robot categories, however, two papers by Doren provide details on potential 
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distributions of Web robots [2] [6].  Doren and his colleagues at the University of Connecticut 
collected the data between 2007 and 2009. 
 
Figure 1 - Percentage of Robots by HTTP Requests 
2.2 Determining Humanness 
By assessing log files and form interactions, it is possible to identify non-human requests.  Current 
research suggests that various measures of internet-browsing patterns can identify robots.  For 
example, indexers often visit a robots.txt file on the Web server, where humans seldom visit this 
resource.  It is possible to determine potential robots by weighing the time between requests and 
the time a robot interacts with a Web page.  Evaluation of request headers and other common Web-
browser behaviors to gauge whether a user is a Web robot is promising.  Several attributes used as 
heuristic detection markers [7] are:  
1) Did the user request the “robots.txt” file? 
2) What is the time between requests? 
3) What is the variance between request times? 
4) Are there 404 response codes? 
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5) Are there 400 response codes? 
6) Does the request have a bot user-agent header? 
7) Does the request have a user-agent header that does not match a common browser? 
8) Do requests have the same or similar referrer for each page visited? 
9) Does the URL resolution has high number of unresolved requests? 
10) Is the HTTP version number included? 
Comparing the requesting IP address to a list of IP addresses known to generate traffic via 
autonomous agents can identify robot agents.  For example, Google states their robots originate 
from a DNS entry whose domain is googlebot.com or google.com.  The address returned by doing 
a hostname lookup for a potential robot is a value whose domain was as specified above.  During 
this writing, IP Address: 66.249.66.1 gives a hostname of “crawl-66-249-66-1.googlebot.com” and 
is defined as a google crawler. 
When machine learning algorithms are trained using the patterns of known Web robots, 
autonomous agents can be identified.  Classification techniques such as neural networks, support 
vector machines, and decision trees are examples of these algorithms.  This thesis later introduces 
these algorithms and the results of these classifiers. 
2.3 Behaviors of Agents 
2.3.1 Human Behavior 
Several mechanisms identify human behavior on the Web.  These mechanisms assess Web page 
access time, session costs, session length, and link following behavior [1] [7] [8] [9]. 
Humans seldom access multiple different Web pages within a single second.  Human browsing 
requires visual or auditory processing which results in much slower request times than automated 
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agents.  It is even rarer for humans to access different Web pages within a single half second.  Web 
browsers used by humans load additional resources such as images, script files, and other 
multimedia content. 
By requesting multimedia and script files, a typical human session costs more network bandwidth 
and memory than a robot agent does.  Robot agents tend to forgo these additional resources, as 
they do not provide the resources that most robots require. 
Session length, the number of Web page requests made by an agent, is an important criterion when 
determining if an agent is human.  Humans typically request fewer Web pages than robots in any 
given session [1].  Humans regularly request fewer Web pages over a session because humans tend 
to follow links of interest, instead of trying to index, or harvest data as robots do.  Because humans 
also process information more slowly than robots, the session times are longer for humans than 
robots.  Humans represent fewer accesses per time interval than robots, which means that the 
number of requests per time interval is a good measure of humanness. 
The way humans follow links is another criterion to consider.  Human behavior regularly follows 
a depth-first approach in following links, whereas robots usually perform a breadth first search.  
Robots tend to queue links located on a Web page, which argues for why robots perform breadth-
first searches.  Moreover, robots follow hidden links more often than do humans. 
2.3.1.1 Predictability and Standard Behavior 
Humans demonstrate several predictable behaviors when it comes to interacting with Web pages.  
This section explores HTTP headers, network behavior patterns, and form interaction behaviors as 
they pertain to human agents. 
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HTTP headers that come from human agents are predictable, meaning they tend not to differentiate 
in the number or type of headers sent.  Wild HTTP headers were captured using a data-capturing 
website.  The methodology of this research explores the way that this Web site captures data and 
discusses how the data is analyzed.  Data collected by this Web site shows that many Web crawlers 
do not submit a cookie header if prompted to send one back to the server; most human agents 
return this header.  The tables below show this behavior for human and robot agents (cells are 
shaded to aid reading).  Only the human responds with the required cookie.  The Data Capture 
Web Site sends a response header “Set-Cookie”, which only human agents seem to respect when 
performing additional requests during a session.  See Table 1 below. 
IP Address URL Header Name Date and Time 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ X-REWRITE-URL 2015-10-25 19:39:40.310 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ 
Upgrade-Insecure-
Requests 2015-10-25 19:39:40.310 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ User-Agent 2015-10-25 19:39:40.310 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Host 2015-10-25 19:39:40.310 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept-Language 2015-10-25 19:39:40.310 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept-Encoding 2015-10-25 19:39:40.310 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept 2015-10-25 19:39:40.310 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Connection 2015-10-25 19:39:40.310 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ X-REWRITE-URL 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ 
Upgrade-Insecure-
Requests 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ User-Agent 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Referrer 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Host 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Cookie 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept-Language 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept-Encoding 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
76.26.211.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept 2015-10-25 19:39:53.640 
Table 1 - Human Headers during a session on the Data Capture Web Site 
Table 1 contrasts with Table 2 in that Table 1 displays the human returning a header, whereas 
Table 2 exhibits robot behavior that does not resend the header. 
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IP Address Url Name Date and Time 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Connection 2015-09-29 20:00:43.097 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept 2015-09-29 20:00:43.097 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept-Language 2015-09-29 20:00:43.097 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Host 2015-09-29 20:00:43.097 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ User-Agent 2015-09-29 20:00:43.097 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ X-REWRITE-URL 2015-09-29 20:00:43.097 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Connection 2015-09-29 20:00:46.537 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept 2015-09-29 20:00:46.537 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept-Encoding 2015-09-29 20:00:46.537 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Accept-Language 2015-09-29 20:00:46.537 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ Host 2015-09-29 20:00:46.537 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ User-Agent 2015-09-29 20:00:46.537 
91.121.169.194 http://www.trytologin.com/ X-REWRITE-URL 2015-09-29 20:00:46.537 
Table 2 - "MJ12bot" Robot headers during a session on the Data Capture Web Site 
Humans tend to request HTTP resources from the main Web page and subsequent visited pages.  
Web page markup exposes resources meant for observation.  Standard Web browser requests 
submit referrer headers, which create a logical click path as the user navigates a Web site.  This is 
due to the agent following links readily available on the web page and by using normal browser 
controls, such as forward and back.  The following table contains a subset of a captured human 
click path. 
IP Address Referrer URL Request Type Date and Time 
202.67.36.228 / /Home/Contact GET 2015-09-11 23:06:44.863 
202.67.36.228 /Home/Contact / GET 2015-09-11 23:06:59.940 
202.67.36.228 / / POST 2015-09-11 23:07:53.200 
202.67.36.228 / / POST 2015-09-11 23:08:02.497 
202.67.36.228 / /Home/About GET 2015-09-11 23:08:15.857 
202.67.36.228 / /Home/About GET 2015-09-11 23:08:16.247 
202.67.36.228 /Home/About / GET 2015-09-11 23:08:21.093 
Table 3 - Human click path 
Patterns have identifiable differences in human and robotic network behavior [6] [10] [11].  For 
example, when human agents access Web pages they tend to create a single HTTP request.  If the 
server load is too high to handle requests in a timely manner, the user often does not continue to 
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make HTTP requests.  Conversely, a robot does not care if response times are long and continues 
to attempt to access the resource from the Web server [10]. 
2.3.2 Robot behavior 
2.3.2.1 Access Materials not generally seen by humans 
Some crawlers attempt to access any resource available to them [11].  Resource availability is 
assessed through different mechanisms such as if the resource appearing with a direct link from 
the Web page, from another resource (such as robots.txt), through trying to access resources from 
a search engine or other site’s links, or by randomly trying to access resources known to exist 
(login pages, configuration files, etc.) [6] [11]. 
Based on the logs from the Data Capture Web Site, it was determined that a robot attempts to 
access denied resources as defined in the robots.txt.  Only one agent accessed denied resources; it 
was likely trying to enumerate resources, which could provide administrative access.  Most ethical 
bots, such as the Google bot and Bing bot, did not attempt to access the resources marked as deny. 
2.3.2.2 Resource Access Times vs Interaction Time 
As presented earlier, Web page access times allow for the identification of robots.  Robots tend to 
access several Web pages very quickly, usually within a fraction of a second.  Human users, while 
they are able to access resources at such speeds, do not usually do so.  Human browsing time tends 
to be over one-half second per page request, whereas robots would have made numerous requests 
for resources in this time [1].   
Another item of interest concerning resource access times is the identification of robots via their 
access of Image files compared to HTML files.  Most crawlers, excluding harvesters, tend not to 
grab images.  Instead, these robots often prefer items of a smaller size such as text files and Web 
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pages [6].  Normal human browsing requests every image on the page, if images exist.  Robots 
tend to exclude these images.  AlNoamany, et al., consider the ratio of 10 Web page requests to < 
1 image request to be robot-like, and the inverse of human behavior [1]. 
2.3.3 Current Measures to Prevent Invalid Agents 
This section covers currently practiced methods that prevent invalid, or unauthorized, agents from 
accessing systems or resources.  These methods include attempts to prevent robot access and 
attempts to prevent unauthorized accesses to resources and materials.   
2.3.3.1 Primary authentication and verification methods 
Most robot prevention takes place when an agent attempts to submit a Web form.  The most 
common of these is CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and 
Humans Apart).  Other methods for authentication and user verification include form 
authentication, Kerberos authentication, and external authentication methods. 
2.3.3.1.1 CAPTCHA 
CAPTCHA is the most widely used tool to prevent automatic entry of Web forms.  This section 
provides a brief overview of CAPTCHA; however, the implementation details are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  The basis of its use is simple: create a scenario, which is difficult for robots 
to process correctly, but effortless for humans to do.  While initially just asking the user to type 
the text in a distorted image, CAPTCHA has gone through several different iterations throughout 
the years.  One subsequent iteration of CAPTCHA is reCAPTCHA.  To improve on CAPTCHA, 
reCAPTCHA allows for additional character distortions, rotations, and spacing.  Unfortunately, as 
robots have become more capable of reading text on an image, humans continue to struggle with 
reading the text.  Ease-of-use methods for CAPTCHA and reCAPTCHA were explored, as well as 
an attempt to make use of the human generated data.  Ease-of-use methods, such as asking the user 
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to click an image or widget, or choose a set of images that match a description are currently in use.  
CAPTCHA and reCAPTCHA use the data gathered from the initial methods to digitize text, aid 
in machine learning, and describe various images.   
There are currently robots able to read most CAPTCHA images with a high success rate, some of 
which are commercially available.  As the prevalence of robots increases, the demand for robot 
detection changes dramatically.  Robots have bypassed even the new methods of CAPTCHA. 
Next, several common authentication methods that validate a user are explored. 
2.3.3.1.2 Form Authentication 
Form authentication, and Internet basic authentication, requires the user to enter a username and 
password combination before allowing access to resources of the Web page.   
The idea of password authentication has been in existence for millennia and is the most common 
form of user authentication.  Security measures are beginning to include secondary-authentication 
methods.  Secondary authentication helps prevent unauthorized access from different entities, 
when malicious users compromise usernames and passwords. 
In the research conducted for this thesis, form authentication was the authentication measure 
utilized to authenticate users. 
2.3.3.1.3 Kerberos Authentication 
Kerberos is another popular authentication method used when accessing Web applications.  This 
verification method uses a domain controller system to authenticate agents.  This ensures 
authentication for the domain controller to the agent.   
The basic process for Kerberos authentication is as follows:   
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1. A client requests credentials for a server from the domain controller. 
2. The domain controller gives the client the credentials, which include a session password, 
encrypted with the client’s password (held by the domain controller).   
3. The client transmits the identity to the server using the session key provided by the domain 
controller.   
4. The server then authenticates the information as valid, and allows the client to proceed.   
As further protection, the use of a ticket-granting server to supply authentication tickets is used.  
Ticket-granting servers allow sessions to maintain associated tickets, which are valid for only a 
limited duration and are invalidated at the request of the ticket-granting server.  [12] 
NTLM-Authentication (Windows Authentication or challenge/response) is a similar technology, 
developed by Microsoft.  Kerberos Authentication is considered to be an authentication protocol 
superior to NTLM-Authentication, partially due to its ability to provide mutual authentication and 
grant tickets for a limited duration. 
2.3.3.1.4 External Authentication Methods 
Additional authentication methods can use an external host to provide credentials to a system if 
that user has credentials with the external host.  The most frequently used authentication method 
of this type is OAuth.  Corporations such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter use OAuth. 
OAuth authentication is similar to Kerberos Authentication.  There is a trusted authentication 
provider, a client requesting access, and a resource server.  The resource server contains the 
resource that the client is attempting to access.  Using the same method as does Kerberos, the client 
requests credentials - known as tokens - from the authentication server and presents them to the 
resource server.  The resource server, once presented with a token, can verify whether the 
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credentials were provided by the authentication server based on various cryptographic details 
provided by a pre-established set of cryptographic keys or other information [13].   
2.3.3.2 Secondary Authentication  
Since form authentication is the most common authentication type available on the Web, there is 
inherent potential for an unauthorized user using stolen credentials.  To counter this, there are 
various secondary authentication measures, which are widely used on the internet today.  These 
methods send a message to a known external communication device and ask the user to enter a 
challenge response.  A challenge response value contains the content provided in the external 
communication message.  To send these messages, SMS and email are often used.  Some 
authentication tools include key-fobs that generate a password, or part of a password, on a timed 
interval.   
While these secondary measures are highly effective in preventing unauthorized access to 
machines, they are still cumbersome for the end user.  This thesis presents a case that allows human 
typing pattern analysis to perform automatic secondary authentication and unencumbered by 
secondary devices.  The value of this is that typing patterns are unique to every human, as they 
rely on his or her biological movement characteristics.  Robots, on the other hand, perform 
computed and rapid input patterns, which are easier to detect. 
2.4 Determining Uniqueness between Human Agents 
Numerous methods of authentication exist to enhance internet security and local security.  High 
security enterprises need many layers of authentication.  These enterprises include military, 
government, and companies that handle sensitive information.  As a second line of defense, 
security divisions often introduce additional measures to increase the certainty of authentication.  
Some of these already mentioned are “something you know” (username/password) and “something 
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you own” (cellphone/email/smartcard).  The following section looks at biological methods to 
identify an agent, known as “something you are.” 
2.4.1 Biological Differences 
There are several universal ways to identify humans using biometric information.  These types of 
identifications include fingerprint uniqueness, iris (eye) uniqueness, hand dimensions, voice 
evaluation, and signature uniqueness [14] [15] [16] [17].  An active area of research is the 
evaluation of computer interaction signatures – namely typing patterns and mouse movement 
patterns.  While this thesis addresses several topics, an in-depth evaluation is only included for 
computer interaction signatures. 
Sophisticated security systems rely on the exploitation of aforementioned uniqueness inherent in 
human users.  The distinctiveness and permanence of traits in an organism are the bases for 
biological identification.  Although most literature suggests that behavioral traits are weak 
biometric traits, it is possible to enhance security significantly by introducing these traits as by-
products of authentication.  The Internet currently lacks broad support for the use of other 
identification methods, as those methods require specialized hardware and software.  However, 
Web authentication may soon use face and voice recognition, as HTML5 and devices with 
multimedia components become commonplace. 
2.4.1.1 Fingerprints 
It is common knowledge that fingerprint patterns can accurately identify an individual.  Effectively 
matching fingerprints to an individual can accurately identify that individual.   
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2.4.1.2 Signature 
Day-to-day business transactions often use handwritten signatures.  Due to the number of intra-
class variants of characters in handwriting over time, it is difficult to classify a person by his or 
her signature.  Specialized hardware components analyze speed, shape, and pressure during the act 
of signing to increase the effectiveness of determining the handwritten signature.  However, the 
adoption of this method of analysis is rare, as it requires external hardware. 
2.4.1.3 Computer Interaction Signature 
While handwritten signature capturing requires specialized hardware, computer interaction 
signatures require only standard input mechanisms used during computer interaction, such as a 
keyboard or mouse.  Since these hardware components are already part of most personal 
computing systems, the convenience of implementing this evaluation becomes more viable. 
Suggested by Jain and Kumar [17], biometric evaluation should encompass a few inherent traits: 
user convenience, data acquisition environment, and data acquisition quality.  Standard 
mechanisms available on the Internet are able to provide all of these traits.  Utilizing standard input 
devices provides user convenience, while additional information is gathered using custom 
JavaScript behind the scenes.  The data acquisition environment is also provided, due to the same 
reasons as user convenience.  Most interactions with a Web page allows for tracking any input 
mechanic, therefore, data acquisition must quickly adjust to support various metrics.   
Capturing keystroke dynamics is possible by embedding additional biometric controls on a 
standard login form.  This allows for effective capture of biometrics as though an agent filled out 
parts of the login page, which captures usernames and passwords. 
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Keystroke dynamics are captured efficiently through mechanisms provided by modern Web 
browsers.  JavaScript event listeners capture keystroke down events and keystroke release events.  
By capturing these two mechanics, significant information is gathered on how a user’s muscle 
memory and typing patterns are utilized for identification.   
Identifying a user requires a model, which contains the quantum information captured:  
 Time a key is pressed (Down Time) 
 Time between the previous key is pressed and subsequent key is pressed 
 Time the first key is released (Release Time) 
These keystroke dynamics create a model using these criteria for every key pressed during 
interaction with the form. 
In Table 4 below, a user types a simple password “HELLO”.  The information gathered here is 
useful to evaluate the typing pattern of the particular agent. 
Key H E L L O 
Down Time (ms) 0 84 140 251 334 
Release Time 
(ms) 114 184 205 307 402 
Table 4 - Password times between keystrokes 
In order to visualize this information, Figure 2 is provided for convenience. 
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Figure 2 - Visual representation of typed characters 
This information is used to create a series of metrics, which include the duration for which a key 
is held and the time until following key is pressed.  Negative values in the time between press and 
release indicate that the subsequent key was pressed before the previous key was released; positive 
values specify a key was released before the succeeding key was pressed.  This additional step aids 
in authentication, as the data now contains overlap information.  Table 5 is shown below. 
Key H E L L O 
Held Time (ms) 114 100 65 56 68 
Time between press and 
previous key released (ms) 
0 -30 -44 46 27 
Table 5 - Differences in time based on when a key is pressed and the previous key released 
There are two axis points displayed in Figure 3, which allow for classification later.  The 
alternating values of key-down time and time between keypresses are used to generate a timing 
vector that serves as classification training data.   
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Figure 3 - Pattern of the transformed data that has been captured. 
The timing vector of this sample is [114, 0, -30, 100, -44, 65, 46, 56, 27, 68].  Some researchers, 
such as Cho [18], add a keystroke to supplant additional values at the end of the timing vector by 
pressing the return key.  The implementation provided in this research supplants zero as the second 
value of the dataset to indicate the start of initial data capture, although this value could be omitted. 
Several mechanisms exist to classify a user’s keystroke dynamics.  Researchers capture and apply 
this data for use in backpropagation neural networks.  Results as low as 2% false acceptance rate 
(FAR) and false rejection rates (FRR) have been achieved [19] [18].  Another user identification 
method is to create a master trajectory profile that categorizes a user based on the amount of 
dissimilarity encountered.  Results have reached FAR and FRR as low as 4% using this method 
[20]. 
Including additional measures to increase the number of inputs is also achievable.  Garg [21] 
advocates using meta-key information such as key type change (alpha to numeric) and the number 
of times the backspace key, shift key, and caps lock key are pressed during data entry.  
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Shanmugapriya [22] suggests the creation and use of a new measure called “Virtual Key Force” – 
a measure that takes into account the time between key presses and the distance between keys 
being pressed.  Zhong, et al. [23] also use distances as additional metrics; however, their research 
suggests the typical use of Manhattan distance is insufficient, as it does not scale properly.  
Alternatively, Zhong suggests a hybrid approach of using Manhattan distance and Mahalanobis 
distance. 
The initial presentation of the sample data in Table 4 only considers the key press and hold duration 
times.  To create a superior model of an individual’s behavioral patterns, measures are added to 
increase the number of data points.  Every keystroke is captured including shift, caps lock, and 
control keys as normal key inputs, in the model presented later in this thesis.  These additional 
keys are used to model the user’s input. 
While many researchers claim that backpropagation is a superb tool for determining a user’s 
validity, there remains the aspect of training the model appropriately [18] [19] [23] [24] [25] [26].  
Real systems may find it difficult to train a neural network properly, as the network must be 
retrained for every new user [24].  Even with continuous integration of valid user authentication 
data, the neural network training requires valid and invalid login attempts to identify agents 
adequately.  It is prohibitively expensive for production systems to retrain a model every time a 
user is created, due to the training needs of neural networks. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PURPOSE 
This thesis analyzes the behaviors present in both human and robot agents through Web form 
interaction.  By comparing human and robot agents, the potential for reduction in internet traffic 
and fraudulent impersonation of human can be mitigated.  An attempt to identify pragmatic 
measures using biometric measures as a secondary authentication is also tested. 
If successful, the discrimination between humans and robots relieves humans of the need to 
perform secondary authentication measures such as CAPTCHA.  Instead of having an active 
system to determine humanness, these measures should be evaluable automatically through 
biometric evaluation.  The enhanced security mechanisms present in biometrics will enable web 
applications to become more secure against fraudulent login attempts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
To apply an automatic secondary authentication measure for Web applications that requires no 
additional user input, a Web application was created.  This Web application captures a visiting 
agent’s HTTP headers, session information, and meta-information relating to keyboard and mouse 
inputs.  The information was subsequently used to identify robot agents and compare human agent 
biometric signatures.  The next step is to perform formal research into these various behavioral 
patterns, as will be discussed in this section. 
4.1 Web site to track inputs 
A data capture Web application was created with the intent on capturing aspects of human and 
robot behavior.  The Web site can be found on the public Internet at http://www.trytologin.com.  
All software development efforts were done in C#, JavaScript, CSS, and HTML for the 
application.  This Web page captures HTTP headers, IP Addresses, and form interaction behaviors 
such as key presses and mouse clicks.  A sample of each of these data points is provided in Tables 
6, 7, 8, and 9. 
Table 6 displays one agent’s request headers that visited the Data Capture Web Site. 
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Name Value Date Created 
Connection keep-alive 9/28/2015 3:58 AM 
Accept 
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml; 
q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 9/28/2015 3:58 AM 
Accept-Encoding gzip, deflate, sdch 9/28/2015 3:58 AM 
Accept-Language en-US,en;q=0.8 9/28/2015 3:58 AM 
Host localhost:20151 9/28/2015 3:58 AM 
User-Agent 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) 
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 
Chrome/46.0.2490.42 Safari/537.36 9/28/2015 3:58 AM 
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests 1 9/28/2015 3:58 AM 
Table 6 - Sample Request Headers 
Table 7 displays that same agent’s IP address, referrer, and request type.  This request shows that 
this particular agent submitted information to the Data Capture Web Site. 
Date Saved IP Address Referrer Url Request Type 
9/28/2015 3:58 AM 76.26.211.37 http://trytologin.com http://trytologin.com  POST 
Table 7 - Sample request information 
Table 8 shows the keystroke dynamics by the agent. 
Key Pressed 
Element 
Name Alt Ctrl Shift 
Time 
Released 
Time 
Pressed 
72 Email 0 0 0 112 0 
69 Email 0 0 0 144 -32 
76 Email 0 0 0 408 312 
76 Email 0 0 0 144 40 
79 Email 0 0 0 192 88 
72 Password 0 0 0 2647 2520 
69 Password 0 0 0 2695 -63 
76 Password 0 0 0 369 288 
76 Password 0 0 0 152 56 
79 Password 0 0 0 160 80 
Table 8 - Sample input capture (Keyboard) 
Similar to Table 8, Table 9 shows the mouse click interactions by the agent. 
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MouseX MouseY Button 
Element 
Name Time Pressed 
581 240 0 Password 9/27/2015 11:58 PM 
582 195 0 Email 9/27/2015 11:58 PM 
664 265 0 Password 9/27/2015 11:58 PM 
561 331 0 submit 9/27/2015 11:58 PM 
Table 9 - Sample input capture (Mouse) 
4.1.1 How information is collected and used 
As stated above, many of the users’ interactions are captured during the browsing session that the 
users perform.  All information is stored and submitted in a database; the schema is shown in 
Figure 4.   
The only information used to validate a user were the keystroke patterns that were entered.  Since 
only keystrokes were used to validate users, this mechanism should be treated as a secondary 
authentication metric. 
4.1.1.1 Form Input 
 
Figure 4 - Image of the data capture application 
The Web server receives captured data submitted from a normal HTML form.  Keystroke and 
mouse dynamics are captured through user interaction, and are submitted with the form when the 
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user pressed the submit button.  The user only needs to interact with normal login fields, while no 
additional interaction is necessary to capture keystroke and mouse data.   
Interacting with email and password elements inserts hidden inputs into the form.  The information 
captured by this form is comprised of mouse click metrics, key press metrics, and information 
about which form element is being acted on at the time.  The agent submits data to the Web server 
that stores the information in a database.  Sections of this thesis that follow use these hidden inputs 
to determine the uniqueness of human agents.  Refer to Table 8 - Sample input capture (Keyboard) 
and Table 9 - Sample input capture (Mouse) for sample input data.   
 
4.1.1.2 Database Schema 
The database architecture used to capture and store data from the application is Microsoft SQL 
Server 2014.  Figure 5 - Data Capture Database Schema provides the name, datatype, and nullable 
properties for each column.  The ID column on each table represents that table’s Primary Key 
(PK).  Any field suffixed with “_id” represents a Foreign Key (FK) to the appropriate table. 
The ApplicationRequestContexts table contains high-level information pertaining to each request.  
RequestHeaders has a many-to-one relation with ApplicationRequestContexts and tracks each 
HTTP header per request.  MouseInteractions and KeyboardInteractions contain a many-to-one 
relationship with FormInteractions and track mouse and keyboard metrics, respectively.  
FormInteractions maintains a one-to-one relationship with ApplicationRequestContexts and acts 
as a parent table to MouseInteractions and KeyboardInteractions.  The FormInfo table contains the 
raw input fields that the user submitted to the Web server and has a one-to-one relationship with 
ApplicationRequestContexts.   
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Figure 5 - Data Capture Database Schema 
ApplicationRequestContexts
Id int No
Saved datetime No
IpAddress nvarchar(MAX) Yes
Referrer nvarchar(MAX) Yes
Url nvarchar(MAX) Yes
RequestType int No
FormInteraction_Id int Yes
DateCreated datetime Yes
SignInStatus int No
Column Name Condensed Type Nullable
FormInfo
Id int No
Name nvarchar(MAX) Yes
Value nvarchar(MAX) Yes
ApplicationRequestContext_Id int Yes
DateCreated datetime Yes
Column Name Condensed Type Nullable
FormInteractions
Id int No
DateCreated datetime Yes
Column Name Condensed Type Nullable
KeyboardInteractions
Id int No
KeyPressed int No
FormInteraction_Id int Yes
ElementName nvarchar(10) No
AltPressed bit No
CtrlPressed bit No
ShiftPressed bit No
DateCreated datetime Yes
TimeReleased decimal(18, 2) Yes
TimePressed decimal(18, 2) No
Column Name Condensed Type Nullable
MouseInteractions
Id int No
TimePressed datetime No
MouseX int No
MouseY int No
FormInteraction_Id int Yes
Button int No
ElementName nvarchar(10) No
DateCreated datetime Yes
Column Name Condensed Type Nullable
RequestHeaders
Id int No
Name nvarchar(MAX) Yes
Value nvarchar(MAX) Yes
ApplicationRequestContext_Id int Yes
DateCreated datetime Yes
Column Name Condensed Type Nullable
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4.2 Web Robot Traffic Generation 
Several commercial automatic applications were used to generate reproducible automated traffic.  
Many of these tools incorporate different methods to interact with Web forms, and try to mimic 
human behavior. 
Besides the capture of commercially available Web robots, wild Web robots interacted with the 
Web site and their information was captured. 
4.2.1 Commercial Automated Options 
Several different commercially available programmable Web agents were used to generate traffic 
that submitted the Web form on the Data Capture Web Site.  The agents used were Visual Studio 
Web Tests, Selenium, iMacros, and Sahi.   
4.2.1.1 Visual Studio Web Tests 
Visual Studio, a professional-grade development environment, provides methods to create 
automation tools.  For the Web, however, Visual Studio does not allow for direct interaction with 
the Web page; instead, it opts to send HTTP POST requests with predefined parameters. 
4.2.1.2 Selenium 
Selenium is an open source Web testing framework used to automate tasks, and is widely used in 
the automation industry.  It interacts with a Web browser to perform automated tasks.  Since this 
runs commands through a browser, typical browser headers are shown.   
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4.2.1.3 iMacros 
iMacros is a browser automation tool.  This tool also uses a real Web browser to perform work 
and sends standard header information for each request.   
4.2.1.4 Sahi 
Sahi is another automation framework, which uses a Web browser to perform automated steps.   
4.2.2 Human Biometrics Sample Data Points 
It is crucial to collect a steady sample of data that is used to test the efficacy of different 
classification algorithms.  For each of the experiments performed, the inclusion of six valid login 
attempts was used for training and an additional known login attempt was used for verification.  
Some of the algorithms used require additional training to classify the login attempt correctly; in 
such cases, an additional known invalid login attempt and several randomly generated login 
attempts were captured.  For these tests, the simple password of “hello” was used.  The various 
input parameters are shown below. 
In Tables 10, 11, and 12, the columns prefixed with “H:” indicate the duration a particular key was 
held, and columns prefixed with “RT:” indicate the time after the previous key was released.  If 
the “RT” columns are negative, the previous key was not released when the key was pressed.  All 
times are represented in milliseconds. 
Table 10, shows the set of six known valid login attempts used to train models.  This data is used 
in the training of each classification algorithm to determine if the same user is attempting to login 
to the Web application. 
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Attempt H: 'h' 
RT: 
'' H: 'e' 
RT: 
'h' H: 'l' RT: 'e' H: 'l' RT: 'l' H: 'o' RT: 'l' 
Attempt 1 112 0 144 -32 408 312 144 40 192 88 
Attempt 2 96 0 184 87 456 376 152 56 168 96 
Attempt 3 152 0 191 -87 393 304 143 40 193 89 
Attempt 4 87 0 337 225 353 272 151 46 183 64 
Attempt 5 121 0 144 32 311 231 153 48 187 88 
Attempt 6 112 0 144 -32 408 312 144 40 192 88 
Table 10 - Valid Login Attempts 
Table 11 shows additional captured logins that are used to help validate the model.  Validation 
rules indicate the invalid login should be marked as invalid when validating and the valid login 
should be marked as valid. 
Attempt H: 'h' RT: '' H: 'e' RT: 'h' H: 'l' RT: 'e' H: 'l' RT: 'l' H: 'o' RT: 'l' 
Invalid 
Attempt 112 0 168 -48 104 24 168 55 136 56 
Valid Attempt 152 0 184 -72 368 296 152 49 137 41 
Table 11 - Additional Known Attempts 
Many of the tests require additional training in order to build an accurate classification profile.  
The randomly generated attempts shown in Table 12 are used to simulate invalid login attempts to 
the Web server. 
Generated # H: 'h' RT: '' H: 'e' RT: 'h' H: 'l' RT: 'e' H: 'l' RT: 'l' H: 'o' RT: 'l' 
1 197 0 32 -237 111 -112 223 -63 62 71 
2 18 0 55 140 146 161 60 47 240 214 
3 138 0 98 -81 153 -231 240 -166 183 -98 
4 129 0 5 154 129 29 84 185 47 112 
5 19 0 128 -83 234 177 147 14 233 160 
6 74 0 134 115 138 149 48 -156 16 -167 
7 219 0 29 -46 162 -4 40 -103 110 182 
8 182 0 63 -99 240 80 219 -144 4 -47 
9 176 0 177 62 221 123 66 147 16 -101 
10 41 0 69 106 31 -46 206 -85 97 165 
Table 12 - A sample of randomly generated login attempts 
Figures 6 and 7 present the known valid and invalid records. 
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Figure 6 - Key Hold Times with Fake Login  
 
Figure 7 - Key Press Times with Fake Login 
4.3 Comparison Methods 
Once sufficient data was gathered, several different machine learning and classification algorithms 
were trained and tested to determine if low-volume training sufficed to determine login validity 
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based on key dynamic metrics.  The methods used to create the validation models are 
backpropagation, support vector machines, decision trees, and dissimilarity comparison. 
4.3.1 Backpropagation 
Backpropagation has been a topic for many researchers who attempt to authenticate users via 
keyboard dynamics [19, 18, 20].  In some of the reports, backpropagation has the potential to 
provide accurate results regarding the amount of training provided.   
In the research for this thesis, data was gathered by a Web application created to do so.  User’s 
typed password strokes were captured during several login attempts.  In this way, a 
backpropagation neural network was trained using the C# programming language and 
AForge.Neuro neural network libraries [27].   
Several potential models were created to train the model.  The backpropagation model was trained 
using the valid training samples described above and 100 to 2000 generated invalid logins.   
The backpropagation network was configured as follows: 
 Number of inputs: 10 
 Number of inner layers: between one and five 
 Number of neurons per layer: between one and 1000 
 Number of outputs: 1 
This method required the use of 10 inputs, as per the number of features in the sample set, between 
one and five inner layers with between one and 1000 neurons in each layer, and one output.  The 
classification of a result is valid if the neural network gave an output >= 0.  The classification of a 
result is invalid if the result were less than 0.   
 39 
4.3.2 Support Vector Machines 
Support vector machines add reliable classifications to a data model.  While exploring various 
methodologies to perform classifications, this classification system seemed promising for many 
types of analysis.  The implementation of a support vector machine was used to gauge the 
effectiveness of this model of input. 
Using Accord.Neuro framework [28], the support vector machine evaluated was a kernel support 
vector machine, which had the following parameters: 
 Number of inputs: 10 
 Kernel: Gaussian with a sigma of 100 
 Learning Algorithm: sequential minimal optimization 
The tests run for the SVM ran 1000 times to gain an average baseline.  These tests used the set of 
valid inputs and the known invalid input for training the SVM.  Most tests used a set of randomly 
generated data to train as invalid login attempts.  The tests included either 0, 10, 100, or 1000 
randomly generated inputs to use during training.  Once training finished, 10,000 login attempts 
were classified.  The classification of a result is valid if the SVM gave an output >= 0.  The 
classification of a result is invalid if the result was less than 0.   
4.3.3 Decision Trees 
When training the decision trees, several different parameters regarding invalid testing data were 
evaluated.  The decision tree engine used the C45 algorithm, ten inputs, and continuous variables 
ranging from -10000 to 10000.  Training of the engine included six valid logins, one invalid login, 
and 10,000 generated invalid login attempts.  Results obtained from this initial model encouraged 
the use of additional training using randomly generated invalid logins.  Experiments were then 
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performed using training by 1, 10, 100, 1000, and 5000 randomly generated invalid logins.  The 
classification of a result is valid if the SVM gave an output of one.  The classification of a result 
is invalid if the result were equal to zero.   
4.3.4 Dissimilarity Comparison 
A dissimilarity comparison function compares known inputs to build a generalized model with 
various statistics and compares these values against an attempted validation.   
The general approach of this comparison has its base in statistical modeling.  Several valid login 
attempts were captured to create a master model, also known as a master trajectory.  Five known 
valid inputs were used to create the initial model during the initial implementation of the algorithm.  
The average value for all known features was calculated and stored as if it was a single valid login 
when creating this master trajectory.  Comparison of each valid login attempt to the master 
trajectory was used to calculate average dissimilarity and standard deviation.  Comparison of 
average dissimilarity against any additional input to perform verification takes place once this 
model was created. 
The set of inputs for an attempted login comprises the time a key is pressed, and the previous key 
is released.  The values are stored in an array of numeric values such as [80, 0, 134, -31, 55, 210 
…]. 
These data points are plotted on a Cartesian map to create the known dissimilarity profile; for the 
sample just provided: [{X = 80, Y = 0}, {X = 134, Y = -31}, {X = 55, Y = 210} …].   
Equation 1 shows the general equation for calculating the dissimilarity between two profiles (M 
and A). 
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𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑀,𝐴) = ∑ √(𝑀𝑥𝑖 − 𝐴𝑥𝑖)2 + (𝑀𝑦𝑖 − 𝐴𝑦𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Equation 1 - Dissimilarity Equation 
The equations shown in Equation 2 show the evaluation criteria needed in order to validate if a 
user has typed in the same manner as his or her previous attempts. 
𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + (𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
𝐼𝑠𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑛(𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡) = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡) ≤ 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
Equation 2 – Valid login Function using Dissimilarity method 
When a new login attempt takes place, the dissimilarity between the new attempt and the master 
trajectory are calculated.  This calculation is then compared against an evaluation threshold.  If the 
dissimilarity of the attempt is less than the evaluation threshold, the user is authenticated.   
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
All data used for analysis can be found at https://goo.gl/zkP3TE.  Note that this link requires a 
Georgia Southern University login to access the information. 
5.1 Traffic Analysis 
Clues exist to identify agents as human or robotic when evaluating the traffic generated from the 
Web application.  Most of the indexer robots that accessed the application had some identifier in 
the HTTP request header.  However, other factors should be evaluated, including the inter-page 
accesses and form information gathered by form submissions.   
5.1.1 HTTP Headers and Access Times 
It is possible to identify robot agents through the evaluation of HTTP headers.  However, with 
more sophisticated robot agents, these headers appear as valid user requests.  As described in the 
introduction, there is some disparity between what Web browsers and robot agents submit as HTTP 
headers.  By utilizing the Data Capture Web Site, the exclusion or inclusion of certain field headers 
quickly identifies potential robotic agents.  However, it is more difficult to identify human agents 
from one another if they were to use the same Web browser.  Table 13 shows the most common 
User-Agent headers that were submitted to the Data Capture Web Site.  Note the occurrence of 
values such as “bot”, “agent”, or “spider” (these rows are highlighted). 
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User-Agent Headers 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0) 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html) 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MJ12bot/v1.4.5; http://www.majestic12.co.uk/bot.php?+) 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html) 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:6.0.2) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0.2 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; bingbot/2.0; +http://www.bing.com/bingbot.htm) 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 
Chrome/36.0.1985.143 Safari/537.36 
Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 8_3 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/600.1.4 (KHTML, like 
Gecko) Version/8.0 Mobile/12F70 Safari/600.1.4 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; 
+http://www.google.com/bot.html) 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; NetcraftSurveyAgent/1.0; +info@netcraft.com) 
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 
Chrome/37.0.2062.120 Safari/537.36 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 
Chrome/32.0.1700.107 Safari/537.36 
Table 13 - User-Agent Headers 
Several autonomous agents saw sub-half-second resource access times.  Tables 14 and 15 display 
the resources accessed and their headers.  Resources accessed include “robots.txt”, which is 
generally a resource accessed by robots.  The headers for the same records specify that the User-
Agent is a robot. 
IP Address Url Date 
52.26.82.4 http://www.trytologin.com/ 10/24/2015 7:05:17.677 
52.26.82.4 http://www.trytologin.com/ 10/24/2015 7:05:17.770 
52.26.82.4 http://www.trytologin.com/Home/About 10/24/2015 7:05:18.113 
66.249.79.217 http://www.trytologin.com/robots.txt 10/31/2015 1:42:35.257 
66.249.79.217 http://www.trytologin.com/ 10/31/2015 1:42:35.333 
66.249.79.217 http://www.trytologin.com/robots.txt 11/7/2015 17:17:34.660 
66.249.79.217 http://www.trytologin.com/ 11/7/2015 17:17:34.767 
158.69.225.37 http://www.trytologin.com/robots.txt 12/21/2015 9:31:31.087 
158.69.225.37 http://www.trytologin.com/ 12/21/2015 9:31:31.230 
216.145.14.142 http://www.trytologin.com/ 12/25/2015 1:49:41.457 
216.145.14.142 http://www.trytologin.com/robots.txt 12/25/2015 1:49:38.847 
Table 14 - Resources Accessed by Robots 
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IP Address Date User-Agent 
52.26.82.4 10/24/2015 7:05:17.677 BusinessBot: Nathan@lead-caddy.com 
52.26.82.4 10/24/2015 7:05:17.770 BusinessBot: Nathan@lead-caddy.com 
52.26.82.4 10/24/2015 7:05:18.113 BusinessBot: Nathan@lead-caddy.com 
66.249.79.217 10/31/2015 1:42:35.257 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; 
+http://www.google.com/bot.html) 
66.249.79.217 10/31/2015 1:42:35.333 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; 
+http://www.google.com/bot.html) 
66.249.79.217 11/7/2015 17:17:34.660 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; 
+http://www.google.com/bot.html) 
66.249.79.217 11/7/2015 17:17:34.767 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; 
+http://www.google.com/bot.html) 
158.69.225.37 12/21/2015 9:31:31.087 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Lipperhey-Kaus-
Australis/5.0; 
+https://www.lipperhey.com/en/about/) 
158.69.225.37 12/21/2015 9:31:31.230 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Lipperhey-Kaus-
Australis/5.0; 
+https://www.lipperhey.com/en/about/) 
216.145.14.142 12/25/2015 1:49:41.457 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en; 
rv:1.9.0.13) Gecko/2009073022 Firefox/3.5.2 
(.NET CLR 3.5.30729) SurveyBot/2.3 
(DomainTools) 
216.145.14.142 12/25/2015 1:49:38.847 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en; 
rv:1.9.0.13) Gecko/2009073022 Firefox/3.5.2 
(.NET CLR 3.5.30729) SurveyBot/2.3 
(DomainTools) 
Table 15 - Fast Resource Access Headers 
These results agree with other researchers’ results and report no new results.   
5.1.2 Submitted form Information 
When evaluating submitted form information from several different sources, it was apparent that 
wild robots did not submit the Web form.  This is likely due to the robots being indexers.  As a 
result, these agents were not assessed for biometric information.  However, scripted agents and 
human agents submitted form information.  One reason the form submission functionality is 
excluded is in consideration of the lost time and resources when a Web Site performs input 
validation.   
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5.1.3 Human Agents 
Human agents are often identified primarily by slower request times and by submitting particular 
timing vectors.  Table 16 displays timing vectors for one of the human agents that provided 
information on the Web form.  Negative values in the Time Pressed column indicate that the key 
was pressed before the previous key was released. 
Shift Pressed Time Released Time-Pressed 
0 214 0 
0 101 6 
0 274 -79 
0 374 -154 
1 704 176 
1 544 -208 
0 561 441 
0 664 -96 
0 737 -87 
0 175 80 
0 263 -71 
0 176 32 
0 232 -104 
0 225 104 
0 64 2 
0 239 40 
0 278 -119 
0 321 153 
Table 16 - User submitted timing vector for Email Field 
This agent is categorized as a human due to the variance in the timing vector.  These results are 
provided for comparison of robotic behavior in the following section. 
5.1.4 Visual Studio Web Tests 
Visual Studio Web Tests do not allow for direct interaction with the Web page; instead, it opts to 
send predefined HTTP POST requests.  Visual Studio tests are identified as robotic behavior by 
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evaluating the inter-request time between page access, the subsequent posting of data, and the 
posting of the identical information. 
Successfully capturing and analyzing data has provided striking results.  Request speed is already 
known to be a common robot detection marker.  Nevertheless, repetitive data posting might 
indicate a new robot detection marker. However, to validate this new marker more research is 
needed.   
5.1.5 Selenium 
Selenium uses a Web browser to send commands, resulting in the identification of typical browser 
headers.  However, it is determined that a robot is interacting with the form when the framework 
is used naively due to the rapid insertion of key presses.  These inter-key press times are executed 
with sub-two millisecond timings, a speed that equates to superhuman typing speeds.  Though 
there exist longer delays, it depicts atypical human typing speeds. 
Table 17 shows the keyboard dynamics profile as captured from the Selenium agent. 
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Shift Pressed Time Released (ms) Time-Pressed (ms) 
0 23 0 
0 8 1 
0 4 1 
0 5 1 
0 5 0 
0 5 1 
0 4 0 
0 5 2 
0 76 1 
0 40 -35 
0 39 34 
0 6 2 
0 4 1 
0 5 1 
0 5 2 
0 6 1 
Table 17 - Selenium submitted timing vector for Email Field 
However, since a programming language drives Selenium, it is possible to create delays between 
key presses to modify this behavior.   
As suspected, this agent is easily identifiable through its speed of typing.  The speed of data input 
is not a well-researched topic, and this provides some validity into keystroke dynamics as a 
detection marker. 
5.1.6 iMacros 
iMacros posts standard header information, as it uses the actual browser to perform work.  
However, when inputting data into the login form, no key strokes are sent to the form.  Since no 
key strokes are sent to the form, it becomes apparent that this was not a user typing login 
information.  In this scenario, no timing vectors were captured.  The submission of a form without 
any common input markers is submitted on behalf of an automation tool and is an additional input 
marker for detection of robots. 
 48 
5.1.7 Sahi 
Sahi uses a Web browser to perform automated steps.  Request headers cannot determine if a robot 
is an agent performing actions, due to the agent using a Web browser.  Determination of a robot 
agent was completed by evaluating the submitted key press interval and hold times; these were 
typically less than two milliseconds in duration.   
Table 18 shows a captured timing vector from the Sahi agent.  The input timing from this agent 
shows rapid keypress and key release timings, faster than humans can consistently do so.  The shift 
pressed column shows a Boolean values (1 = true, 0 = false) if the shift key was pressed with 
another key.  The Time Released and Time Pressed columns show timing in milliseconds. 
Shift Pressed Time Released Time-Pressed 
0 1 0 
0 1 1 
0 1 1 
0 2 1 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 1 0 
0 1 0 
0 1 0 
0 1 1 
0 1 1 
0 1 0 
0 1 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
Table 18 - Sahi submitted timing vector for Email Field 
Similarly to the Selenium experiment, results captured here also reflect that rapid input times are 
due to an automated agent entry.  This further adds to the validity that rapid input timing is a 
marker for robot agents. 
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5.2 Timing Vector Analysis 
The behavior patterns the automated agents and humans exhibit are vastly different.  Often, HTTP 
headers differ and display information indicative of robot presence.  Other times, interaction of the 
web page differs significantly.  Evaluation of the form interaction patterns presents a clear 
indication of the differences in input patterns.  Humans, for example, exhibit varying input 
patterns.  Robots tend to maintain constant interaction patterns - if they are provided at all.  In 
addition, robot page request time is often much faster than that of human agents; as previously 
shown in Table 14 - Resources Accessed by Robots. 
5.2.1 Human v Human analysis 
In the later sections, various algorithms including backpropagation, support vector machines, 
decision tree classification, and dissimilarity comparison are evaluated.  For each of these 
algorithms, the data that was used is described in the methodology. 
5.2.1.1 Backpropagation 
While promising in individual research applications, the length of time required by 
backpropagation training prohibits its use in modern Web applications.  Many researchers, who 
experimented with this method to provide a biometric signature for login, utilized several different 
human agents to provide negative training models in their research.  Since this amount of training 
is not practical in the normal iteration of training, additional measures need to be evaluated that 
either extend or differ in methodology provided here.  It is possible that when registering a new 
user account to capture a common phrase and use lazy learning via backpropagation to train the 
model using a single phrase or word.  However, this method requires retraining for every individual 
during account registration.  This does not seem like a practical architecture to use in production 
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ready systems since the training and comparison needs to compare thousands (or more) user inputs 
to provide invalid login data. 
Initial testing of backpropagation yielded unexpected results.  While creating valid training using 
six input samples, five yielded similar data input profiles as shown in Figure 6 - Key Hold Times 
with Fake Login and Figure 7 - Key Press Times with Fake Login. 
Even after training the network with 2000 randomly generated invalid login attempts, the 
backpropagation algorithm calculated these attempts with the same certainty rate as valid login 
attempts.  Because of the small sample of valid logins and training with the invalid data set, there 
is a high probability of accepting invalid user logins.  When training the neural network without 
these randomly generated login attempts, there are only minor differences in classification 
certainty.  These results clearly show that a more robust training system is required to identify the 
biometric markers of typing patterns correctly. 
The experiments performed using backpropagation were ultimately unsuccessful.  Most research 
on this topic supports backpropagation as a highly successful means of providing authentication.  
However, the results gathered with this research suggest otherwise.  Since this method requires a 
substantial amount of training per potential user of the system, this method is not a good choice 
for determining invalid attempts using Web forms.   
5.2.1.2 Support Vector Machines 
As another promising method of classifying data, utilization of support vector machines provided 
successful results.  With adequate random records trained as invalid logins, support vector 
machines accurately determine if a user is valid based on keyboard dynamics. 
Results of this training are shown in Table 19.  Each test performed 10,000 attempted logins.   
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Table 19 shows the results of training and classification, as well as performance metrics.   
# Random Training Records FRR FAR 
Memory 
Usage* 
Processing 
Time* 
5000 11.1% 0.0007% 684MB 1 Second 
1000 1.3% 0.0013% 43MB 288 ms 
100 0.1% 0.0018% 10MB 82 ms 
10 0% 0.0069% 9.7MB 54 ms 
0 100% 100% 9.7MB  51 ms 
Table 19 - Results of Support Vector Machine Training 
It is apparent that the inclusion of the invalid training records significantly increases the accuracy 
of the FAR.  When utilizing 1000 or more random training records, memory and processor 
consumption explodes.  Training with many generated logins causes performance issues if the 
system is in constant high demand. 
Support vector machines are touted as highly accurate methods of clustering data, and the results 
above suggest that this holds true for these experiments.  SVMs display accuracy, which allows 
for secondary authentication using a user’s keystroke dynamics.   
5.2.1.3 Decision Tree 
Decision tree classification shows more promise than does backpropagation classification for this 
data.  Since only a few inputs that classify as valid logins exist, using randomly generated invalid 
values contribute to a very high degree of accuracy towards classifying invalid logins. 
When using the 6 known login attempts for the user input that was captured and one invalid attempt 
to train, the false acceptance rate (FAR) is consistently between 55 and 120 attempts per 10,000 
attempts (.55% to 1.12% false acceptance, with an average of .7977%) when using 10,000 
generated login attempts to test the model against.  The false rejection rate (FRR) for this model 
yielded no errors in the number of falsely rejected attempts when using zero generated login 
attempts; these attempts include the initial valid model and an additional attempted login. 
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As stated in the methodology, attempts to decrease the false acceptance rate used additional invalid 
login training.  While the decrease in false acceptance when trained with more invalid logins, the 
increase in false rejection rates may designate the need for true training rather than generated 
training. 
FAR and FRR values for all tests are shown in Table 20.  These values are per 10,000 generated 
logins.  Max and min values are calculated from repeating testing iterations 1000 times. 
Generated 
Invalid Login 
Count 
False Acceptance 
Min 
False Acceptance 
Max 
False 
Acceptance 
Average 
False 
Rejections 
0 55 110 79.77 0 
10 0 121 60.681 418 
100 19 134 79.708 535 
1000 0 82 27.736 826 
5000 0 32 6.079 775 
Table 20 - Decision Tree Results (values are per 10,000) 
While it is apparent that the false acceptance rate is reduced once significant training is undertaken, 
the number of false rejections increases for most iterations. 
This experiment was unsuccessful at classifying valid authentications using keyboard dynamics.  
This is due to the high false rejection rate seen when using more invalid training data. 
5.2.1.4 Dissimilarity Comparison 
Using the test data with this method produced promising results.  Utilizing only six samples to 
train the model, this method has given an FAR of < 0.04% when tested against a known invalid 
login, and 1000000 generated login attempts with a sigma of 3.0 (explained in the methodology).  
This equates to less than 400 invalid login attempts per million. 
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This method is a highly accurate means of keystroke dynamics classification.  To further test the 
accuracy of this algorithm, another known login attempt was added to the training set.  This login 
attempt pattern differed significantly from the intial training set.  A new master trajectory profile 
was created which accommodated the addition.  Tests were then executed against a valid and 
invalid login attempt.  With the initial sigma value of three, the dissimilarity comparison method 
lends itself to be more accepting of invalid attempts.  The initial sigma of three classified the 
invalid attempt as valid.  By reducing the sigma value to one, the known invalid login attempt was 
classified as invalid and the valid login attempt was classified as valid.  The same test of comparing 
one million generated records against the verification algorithm using this model was executed 
and resulted in a significant reduction in accepted logins – an FAR of < .03% was consistently 
reported.   
Once, the outlier record was removed from the training set and the sigma was set to one, in an 
attempt to reduce FAR.  Valid and invalid tests were classified accurately.  When compared with 
the one million randomly generated attempts, none of these attempts were successful.  This result 
was unexpected and the test was performed one hundred additional times.  The results conclude 
with an FAR of 3/100,000,000 or .000003%.  All valid samples and the additional login attempt 
were classified as valid.  However, by reducing the sigma value to 1, there are potential increases 
in false rejection rates.   
As with SVM results, this method also successfully identifies keystroke dynamics by pattern 
analysis.  This method does not require training against invalid login attempts to classify 
accurately. 
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5.3 Summary 
It is feasible to identify robot agents and human actors with a high degree of accuracy using 
interaction patterns of a Web application.  However, many of the behavioral patterns exhibited by 
robots are programmable to act like humans.  Clever programming can mimic humans by slowing 
interactions, prioritizing click paths, changing the rate that input commands are sent, and making 
requests from known web browsers.  Humans are also uniquely identifiable by their biometric 
signatures while interacting with Web pages. 
Many Web robots self-identify using HTTP headers.  Most of the robots whose data were captured 
via the Web application were typically found doing one of the following: 
 Submitting an HTTP Agent header that identifies as a bot 
 Accessing robots.txt 
 Having fast request times impossible for a human user 
 Performing abnormal click paths 
 Accessing hidden resources 
 Having exceptionally fast keystrokes 
Early identification and session termination can reduce network and processor load of the Web 
server.  This reduces the risk of DDoS attacks.  By distinguishing robots with malicious intent, 
additional security risks are mitigated by disallowing these agents to attempt to login to the system. 
In the event of humans logging into a Web application, it is viable to utilize layers of security to 
the login process.  It has been shown that even with small amounts of valid training data, accurate 
identification models identify a particular user based on keystroke dynamic biometric signatures.  
Many researchers suggest the implementing neural networks to identify users; however, without 
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significant training of each user model, the applicability of neural networks and backpropagation 
is not feasible at this time.  A superior set of choices is found in using support vector machines or 
through dissimilarity comparison, which had false acceptance rates of less than .01 percent of the 
randomly generated login attempts, and false rejection rates, which do not inhibit the user through 
most use cases.    
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CHAPTER 6 
FUTURE WORK 
While the use of keystroke dynamics to identify human agents is beneficial for security purposes, 
the behavioral changes humans exhibit over time may cause inaccuracies in long-term model 
generation.  Temporal analysis of these behavioral changes is needed to bring keystroke dynamics 
to worldwide use.  Models with higher accuracy may be developed by identifying a subset of valid 
records that best fits behavioral patterns demonstrated by a particular human. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
By evaluating the various information that a Web agent provides to a Web server, a promising 
assortment of performance and security optimizations can be implemented.  Differentiating 
humans from Web robots and limiting the robot’s resources will significantly reduce bandwidth 
consumption.  Lastly, coupling of the capture of biometric information with its subsequent analysis 
increases security quite dramatically.  
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 APPENDICES 
A Dissimilarity Algorithm 
Code 1 - Validate by Dissimilarity
bool function verificationPattern ( 
    double[][] knownInputs,  
    double[] inputToValidate,  
    double sigma)  
{ 
    var masterProfile = CreateMasterProfile(knownInputs); 
    var dissimilarityProfile = CreateDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, masterProfile); 
    var inputToValidateDissimilarity = CalculateDissimilarity(masterProfile, inputToValidate); 
    return inputToValidateDissimilarity <  
            (dissimilarityProfile.Average() +  (sigma*dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation())); 
} 
 
double[] function CreateMasterProfile(knownInputs)  
{ 
    var masterProfile = new double[]; 
    for (var i = 0; i < length; i++) 
        { 
            for (var j = 0; j < knownInputCount; j++) 
            { 
                masterProfile[i] += knownInputs[j][i]/knownInputs.Count(); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    return masterProfile; 
} 
 
double function CalculateDissimilarity( 
    double[] masterProfile, 
    double[] inputToValidate) 
{ 
    var dissimilarity = 0d; 
    for (var j = 0; j < lengthOfInput; j+=2) 
    { 
        dissimilarity += distance( 
            masterProfile[j],    //x1 
            inputToValidate[j],  //x2 
            masterProfile[j+1],  //y1 
            inputToValidate[j+1] //y2  
        ) 
    } 
    return dissimilarity; 
}  
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double[] CreateDissimilarityProfile( 
            double[][] knownInputs, 
            double[] masterProfile) 
{ 
    var knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage = new double[lengthOfInput/2]; 
    for (var i = 0; i < lengthOfInput; i+=2) 
    { 
        var dissimilarityLocal = 0d; 
        for (var j = 0; j < knownInputs.Length; j++) 
        { 
            knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage[i/2] += distance( 
                masterProfile[i],    //x1 
                knownInputs[j][i],   //x2 
                masterProfile[i+1],  //y1 
                knownInputs[j][i + 1]//y2 
            ) 
        } 
    } 
    return knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage; 
}   
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B Data Capture Layout Template Markup 
<!DOCTYPE html> 
<html> 
<head> 
    <meta name="description" content="Try To Login A Social Experiment.  A human vs robot 
detection application.  My graduate thesis research web page."/> 
    <meta name="keywords" content="Try, To, Login, Try To Login, trytologin, tryto-
login.com, bot, robot, webbot, human, detect, detection, identify, identification"/> 
    <meta name="author" content="Ben Cooley"/> 
    <meta name="language" content="English"/> 
    <meta charset="utf-8"/> 
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0"/> 
    <title>Try To Login.com</title> 
    @Styles.Render("~/Content/css") 
    @Scripts.Render("~/bundles/modernizr") 
</head> 
<body> 
<div class="navbar navbar-inverse navbar-fixed-top"> 
    <div class="container"> 
        <div class="navbar-header"> 
            <button type="button" 
                    class="navbar-toggle" 
                    Data-toggle="collapse" 
                    Data-target=".navbar-collapse"> 
                <span class="icon-bar"></span> 
                <span class="icon-bar"></span> 
                <span class="icon-bar"></span> 
            </button> 
            @Html.ActionLink("Try To Login", 
                "Index", 
                "Home", 
                new { area = "" }, 
                new { @class = "navbar-brand" }) 
        </div> 
        <div class="navbar-collapse collapse"> 
            <ul class="nav navbar-nav"> 
                <li>@Html.ActionLink("Login", "Index", "Home")</li> 
                <li>@Html.ActionLink("About", "About", "Home")</li> 
                <li>@Html.ActionLink("Contact", "Contact", "Home")</li> 
            </ul> 
        </div> 
    </div> 
</div> 
<div class="container body-content"> 
    @RenderBody() 
    <hr/> 
    <footer> 
        <p>&copy; @DateTime.Now.Year - TryToLogin.com</p> 
    </footer> 
</div> 
 
@Scripts.Render("~/bundles/jquery") 
@Scripts.Render("~/bundles/bootstrap") 
@RenderSection("scripts", false) 
</body> 
</html> 
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C Login Page Markup 
@model Thesis.Models.LoginViewModel 
@{ 
    ViewBag.Title = "Try To Log in"; 
} 
<h1>@ViewBag.Title.</h1> 
<div class="row"> 
    <div class="col-md-8"> 
        <section id="loginForm"> 
            @using (Html.BeginForm("Index", 
                "Home", 
                new { ViewBag.ReturnUrl }, 
                FormMethod.Post, 
                new 
                { 
                    @class = "form-horizontal", 
                    role = "form" 
                })) 
            { 
                @Html.AntiForgeryToken() 
                <h4>Try to log in.</h4> 
                <hr/> 
                @Html.ValidationSummary(false, "", new { @class = "text-danger" }) 
                <div class="form-group"> 
                    @Html.LabelFor(m => m.Email, new { @class = "col-md-2 control-label" }) 
                    <div class="col-md-10"> 
                        @Html.TextBoxFor(m => m.Email, new 
                        { 
                            @class = "form-control", 
                            v_on = "click: addClick, keydown: addKeyDown, keyup: addKeyUp" 
                        }) 
                        @Html.ValidationMessageFor(m => m.Email, 
                            "", 
                            new { @class = "text-danger" }) 
                    </div> 
                </div> 
                <div class="form-group"> 
                    @Html.LabelFor(m => m.Password, new { @class = "col-md-2 control-label" }) 
                    <div class="col-md-10"> 
                        @Html.PasswordFor(m => m.Password, new 
                        { 
                            @class = "form-control", 
                            v_on = "click: addClick, keydown: addKeyDown, keyup: addKeyUp" 
                        }) 
                        @Html.ValidationMessageFor(m => m.Password, "", new 
                        { 
                            @class = "text-danger" 
                        }) 
                    </div> 
                </div> 
                <div class="form-group"> 
                    <div class="col-md-10 col-md-offset-2"> 
                        <input class="btn btn-default" 
                               name="submit" 
                               type="submit" 
                               value="Log in" 
                               v-on="click: addClick, keydown: addKeyDown, keyup: addKeyUp"/> 
                    </div> 
                </div> 
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                <div class="hidden" 
                     v-repeat="request.formInteraction.keyboardInteractions"> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].KeyPressed" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{keyPressed}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].AltPressed" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{altPressed || 'false'}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].CtrlPressed" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{ctrlPressed || 'false'}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].ShiftPressed" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{shiftPressed || 'false'}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].TimePressed" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{timePressed}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].TimeReleased" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{timeReleased}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="KeyboardInteraction[{{$index}}].ElementName" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{elementName}}"/> 
                </div> 
                <div class="hidden" 
                     v-repeat="request.formInteraction.mouseInteractions"> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].MouseX" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{mouseX}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].MouseY" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{mouseY}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].Button" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{button}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].TimePressed" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{timePressed}}"/> 
                    <input class="form-control" 
                           name="MouseInteraction[{{$index}}].ElementName" 
                           type="hidden" 
                           value="{{elementName}}"/> 
                </div> 
            } 
        </section> 
    </div> 
</div> 
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@section Scripts { 
    @Scripts.Render("~/bundles/jqueryval") 
    @Scripts.Render("~/bundles/ui") 
} 
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D Non-Intrusive Data Capturing JavaScript  
 
$(function () { 
    var ui = new Vue({ 
      el: "#loginForm", 
      data: function () { 
        return { 
          request: { 
            formInteraction: { 
              keyboardInteractions: [], 
              mouseInteractions: [] 
            } 
          }, 
          keysPressed: {}, 
          startTime: undefined, 
          keysDown: [] 
        }; 
      }, 
      methods: { 
        addClick: function (e) { 
          var interaction = { 
            mouseX: parseInt(e.clientX || e.x), 
            mouseY: parseInt(e.clientY || e.y), 
            button: e.button, 
            timePressed: new Date().toISOString(), 
            elementName: e.target.name 
          }; 
          this.request.formInteraction.mouseInteractions.push(interaction); 
        }, 
        addKeyDown: function (e) { 
          if (!this.keysPressed[e.keyCode]) { 
            var time = new Date(); 
            this.startTime = this.startTime || time.getTime(); 
            var interaction = { 
              altPressed: e.altKey, 
              ctrlPressed: e.ctrlKey, 
              shiftPressed: e.shiftKey, 
              keyPressed: e.keyCode, 
              time: time, 
              timeReleased: "", 
              elementName: e.target.name 
            }; 
            this.keysPressed[e.keyCode] = interaction; 
            interaction.timePressed = this.keysDown.length ? 
              -1 * (time.getTime() - this.keysDown[0].time.getTime()) : 
              time.getTime() - this.startTime; 
            this.keysDown.push(interaction); 
            this.request.formInteraction.keyboardInteractions.push(interaction); 
          } 
        },  
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addKeyUp: function (e) { 
          var pressedKey = this.keysPressed[e.keyCode]; 
          if (pressedKey) { 
            var time = new Date(); 
            pressedKey.timeReleased = time.getTime() - this.startTime; 
            var index = this.keysDown.indexOf(pressedKey); 
            index > -1 && this.keysDown.splice(index, 1); 
            this.keysDown.length || (this.startTime = time.getTime()); 
            delete this.keysPressed[e.keyCode]; 
          } 
        } 
      } 
    }); 
  } 
); 
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E Interaction Form Controller  
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
using System.Web; 
using System.Web.Mvc; 
using Microsoft.AspNet.Identity.Owin; 
using Thesis.Data; 
using Thesis.Data.FormIInteraction; 
using Thesis.Data.Request; 
using Thesis.Models; 
using Thesis.Models.Services; 
 
namespace Thesis.Controllers 
{ 
    public class HomeController : Controller 
    { 
        private readonly IApplicationDbContext _db; 
        private ApplicationSignInManager _signInManager; 
 
        public HomeController(IApplicationDbContext db) 
        { 
            _db = db; 
        } 
 
        public ApplicationSignInManager SignInManager 
            => 
                _signInManager ?? 
                (_signInManager = 
                    HttpContext.GetOwinContext().Get<ApplicationSignInManager>()) 
            ; 
 
        public async Task<ActionResult> Index() 
        { 
            var request = CreateRequestObject(new LoginViewModel(), 
                RequestType.Get); 
            _db.Requests.Add(request); 
            await _db.SaveChangesAsync(); 
            return View(); 
        } 
 
        public async Task<ActionResult> About() 
        { 
            ViewBag.Message = "For a graduate degree thesis"; 
            var request = CreateRequestObject(new LoginViewModel(), 
                RequestType.Get); 
            _db.Requests.Add(request); 
            await _db.SaveChangesAsync(); 
            return View(); 
        }  
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        [ActionName("Index")] 
        [HttpPost] 
        [AllowAnonymous] 
        [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] 
        public async Task<ActionResult> Login( 
            LoginViewModel model, 
            string returnUrl) 
        { 
            var request = CreateRequestObject(model); 
            request.SignInStatus = SignInStatus.Failure; 
 
            if (!ModelState.IsValid) 
            { 
                return View("Index"); 
            } 
 
            var result = 
                await 
                    SignInManager.PasswordSignInAsync(model.Email, 
                        model.Password, 
                        model.RememberMe, 
                        false); 
 
            request.SignInStatus = result; 
 
            _db.Requests.Add(request); 
            await _db.SaveChangesAsync(); 
 
            switch (result) 
            { 
                case SignInStatus.Success: 
                    return View("Success"); 
 
                default: 
                    ModelState.AddModelError("", "Invalid login attempt."); 
                    return View("Index"); 
            } 
        } 
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        private ApplicationRequestContext CreateRequestObject( 
            LoginViewModel model, 
            RequestType requestType = RequestType.Post) 
        { 
            var request = new ApplicationRequestContext 
            { 
                Headers = new List<ApplicationRequestHeader>(), 
                Form = 
                    requestType == RequestType.Post 
                        ? new List<ApplicationRequestForm>() 
                        : null 
            }; 
 
            if (requestType == RequestType.Post) 
            { 
                foreach ( 
                    var key in 
                        Request.Form.AllKeys.Where( 
                            key => 
                                !key.ToLower().Contains("keyboardinteraction") && 
                                !key.ToLower().Contains("mouseinteraction"))) 
                { 
                    request.Form.Add(new ApplicationRequestForm 
                    { 
                        Name = key, 
                        Value = Request.Form[key] 
                    }); 
                } 
                request.FormInteraction = new FormInteraction 
                { 
                    KeyboardInteractions = 
                        (model.KeyboardInteraction ?? 
                         new KeyboardInteraction[] { }).ToList(), 
                    MouseInteractions = 
                        (model.MouseInteraction ?? new MouseInteraction[] { }) 
                            .ToList() 
                }; 
            } 
            foreach (var key in Request.Headers.AllKeys) 
            { 
                request.Headers.Add(new ApplicationRequestHeader 
                { 
                    Name = key, 
                    Value = Request.Headers[key] 
                }); 
            } 
            request.IpAddress = Request.UserHostAddress; 
            if (Request.UrlReferrer != null) 
                request.Referrer = Request.UrlReferrer.AbsoluteUri; 
            request.RequestType = requestType; 
            if (Request.Url != null) request.Url = Request.Url.AbsoluteUri; 
            return request; 
        } 
    } 
} 
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F Object Model Entities 
using System; 
using System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations; 
using System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations.Schema; 
 
namespace Thesis.Data 
{ 
    public class IdentityModel 
    { 
        public IdentityModel() 
        { 
            DateCreated = DateTime.UtcNow; 
        } 
 
        [Key] 
        public int Id { get; set; } 
 
        public DateTime? DateCreated { get; set; } 
    } 
} 
namespace Thesis.Data.Request 
{ 
    public enum RequestType 
    { 
        Get = 0, 
        Post = 1 
    } 
 
    public class DictionaryEntity : IdentityModel 
    { 
        public string Name { get; set; } 
        public string Value { get; set; } 
    } 
 
    [Table("RequestHeaders")] 
    public class ApplicationRequestHeader : DictionaryEntity 
    { 
    } 
 
    [Table("FormInfo")] 
    public class ApplicationRequestForm : DictionaryEntity 
    { 
    } 
} 
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using System.Data.Entity; 
using Microsoft.AspNet.Identity.EntityFramework; 
using Thesis.Data.Authentication; 
using Thesis.Data.Request; 
 
namespace Thesis.Data 
{ 
    public class ApplicationDbContext : IdentityDbContext<ApplicationUser>, 
        IApplicationDbContext 
    { 
        public ApplicationDbContext() 
            : base("DefaultConnection", false) 
        { 
        } 
 
        public DbSet<ApplicationRequestContext> Requests { get; set; } 
 
        public static ApplicationDbContext Create() 
        { 
            return new ApplicationDbContext(); 
        } 
    } 
} 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using Microsoft.AspNet.Identity.Owin; 
using Thesis.Data.FormIInteraction; 
 
namespace Thesis.Data.Request 
{ 
    public class ApplicationRequestContext : IdentityModel 
    { 
        public ApplicationRequestContext() 
        { 
            Saved = DateTime.UtcNow; 
        } 
 
        public DateTime Saved { get; set; } 
        public string IpAddress { get; set; } 
        public string Referrer { get; set; } 
        public virtual ICollection<ApplicationRequestHeader> Headers { get; set; } 
        public virtual ICollection<ApplicationRequestForm> Form { get; set; } 
        public string Url { get; set; } 
        public RequestType RequestType { get; set; } 
        public virtual FormInteraction FormInteraction { get; set; } 
        public SignInStatus SignInStatus { get; set; } 
    } 
} 
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using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations; 
 
namespace Thesis.Data.FormIInteraction 
{ 
    public enum MouseButton 
    { 
        Left = 0, 
        Middle = 1, 
        Right = 2 
    } 
 
    public class FormInteraction : IdentityModel 
    { 
        public ICollection<KeyboardInteraction> KeyboardInteractions { get; set; } 
        public ICollection<MouseInteraction> MouseInteractions { get; set; } 
    } 
 
    public class MouseInteraction : IdentityModel 
    { 
        [Required] 
        public DateTime? TimePressed { get; set; } 
 
        [Required] 
        public int? MouseX { get; set; } 
 
        [Required] 
        public int? MouseY { get; set; } 
 
        [Required] 
        public MouseButton? Button { get; set; } 
         
        [StringLength(10), Required] 
        public string ElementName { get; set; } 
    } 
 
    public class KeyboardInteraction : IdentityModel 
    { 
        [Required] 
        public decimal? TimePressed { get; set; } 
 
        public decimal? TimeReleased { get; set; } 
 
        [Required] 
        public int? KeyPressed { get; set; } 
 
        [StringLength(10), Required] 
        public string ElementName { get; set; } 
         
        public bool AltPressed { get; set; } 
         
        public bool CtrlPressed { get; set; } 
         
        public bool ShiftPressed { get; set; } 
    } 
} 
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G Backpropagation Classifier 
using System; 
using AForge.Neuro; 
using AForge.Neuro.Learning; 
 
namespace Thesis.Data.Classifiers 
{ 
  public class Backpropagation 
  { 
    public ActivationNetwork Network { get; } 
    public BackPropagationLearning Teacher { get; } 
 
    public Backpropagation() 
    { 
      Network = new ActivationNetwork(new BipolarSigmoidFunction(1), 10, 10, 1); 
      Teacher = new BackPropagationLearning(Network); 
    } 
 
    public string[] BackPropogationTrain(double[][] inputData, double[][] outputData, int 
iterations) 
    { 
      bool needStopping = false; 
      int iterateCount = 0; 
      double error = 0; 
      string[] results = new string[2]; 
      double[][] input = inputData; 
      double[][] output = outputData; 
 
      Teacher.LearningRate = .1d; 
      while (!needStopping) 
      { 
        error = Teacher.RunEpoch(input, output); 
         
        if (error == 0)  
        { 
          break; 
        } 
        else if (Math.Round(error, 2) == 0)  
        { 
          break; 
        } 
        else if (iterateCount < iterations)  
        { 
          iterateCount++; 
        } 
        else 
        { 
          needStopping = true; 
        } 
        iterateCount++; 
      } 
      results[0] = error.ToString(); 
      results[1] = iterateCount.ToString(); 
      return results; 
    } 
  } 
}  
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H Support Vector Machine Classifier 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using Accord.MachineLearning.VectorMachines; 
using Accord.MachineLearning.VectorMachines.Learning; 
using Accord.Statistics.Kernels; 
 
namespace Thesis.Data.Classifiers 
{ 
    public class KernelSupportVectorMachines 
    { 
        private readonly KernelSupportVectorMachine _ksvm; 
 
        public KernelSupportVectorMachines() 
        { 
            _ksvm = new KernelSupportVectorMachine(new Gaussian(100), 10); 
        } 
 
        public double Train(double[][] inputs, int[] outputs) 
        { 
            for (var i = 0; i < outputs.Length; i++) 
            { 
                outputs[i] = outputs[i] >= 1 ? 1 : -1; 
            } 
 
            var smo = new SequentialMinimalOptimization(_ksvm, inputs, outputs) 
            { 
                UseComplexityHeuristic = true 
            }; 
 
            return smo.Run(true); 
        } 
 
        public IEnumerable<double> Classify(double[][] inputs) 
        { 
            foreach (var input in inputs) 
            { 
                yield return _ksvm.Compute(input); 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
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I Decision Tree Classifier 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using Accord.MachineLearning.DecisionTrees; 
using Accord.MachineLearning.DecisionTrees.Learning; 
using Accord.Math; 
using AForge; 
 
namespace Thesis.Data.Classifiers 
{ 
    public class DecisionTreeClassifier 
    { 
        public DecisionTreeClassifier() 
        { 
            Tree = new DecisionTree(new List<DecisionVariable>( 
                new[] 
                { 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("0", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("1", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("2", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("3", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("4", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("5", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("6", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("7", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("8", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)), 
                    DecisionVariable.Continuous("9", new DoubleRange(-10000, 10000)) 
                }), 2); 
 
            Teacher = new C45Learning(Tree); 
        } 
 
        C45Learning Teacher { get; } 
        public DecisionTree Tree { get; } 
 
        public double Train(double[][] inputs, int[] outputs) 
        { 
            // The C4.5 algorithm expects the class labels to 
            // range from 0 to k, so we convert -1 to be zero: 
            outputs = outputs.Apply(x => x = (x <= 0 ? 0 : 1)); 
            var error = Teacher.Run(inputs, outputs); 
            return error; 
        } 
 
        public IEnumerable<int> Classify(double[][] inputs) 
        { 
            return inputs.Apply(x => Tree.Compute(x)); 
        } 
    } 
} 
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J Dissimilarity Comparison Classifier 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using Accord.Statistics; 
 
namespace Thesis.Data.Classifiers 
{ 
    public static class DissimilarityComparison 
    { 
        public static bool AuthenticateUser( 
            double[][] knownInputs, 
            double[] profileToValidate, 
            double sigma) 
        { 
            var length = knownInputs[0].Count(); 
            if (knownInputs.Any(profile => length != profile.Count())) 
            { 
                throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(nameof(knownInputs)); 
            } 
            if (profileToValidate.Count() != length) 
                return false; 
            var masterTrajectoryProfile = 
                CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(knownInputs, length); 
 
            var dissimilarityProfile = 
                GetDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, 
                    masterTrajectoryProfile, 
                    length); 
            var knownAverageDissimilarity = dissimilarityProfile.Average(); 
            var knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity = 
                dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation(); 
 
            return IsProfileValid( 
                masterTrajectoryProfile, 
                profileToValidate, 
                knownAverageDissimilarity, 
                knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
                sigma); 
        } 
 
        public static bool IsProfileValid( 
            double[] masterTrajectoryProfile, 
            double[] profileToValidate, 
            double knownAverageDissimilarity, 
            double knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
            double sigma) 
        { 
            var profileToCheckDissimilarity = 
                GetDissimilarity(masterTrajectoryProfile, profileToValidate); 
            return profileToCheckDissimilarity < 
                   knownAverageDissimilarity + 
                   sigma*knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity; 
        }  
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        public static double[] GetDissimilarityProfile( 
            double[][] knownInputs, 
            IReadOnlyList<double> masterTrajectoryProfile, 
            int length) 
        { 
            var knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage = new double[length/2]; 
 
            for (var i = 0; i < length; i += 2) 
            { 
                foreach (var input in knownInputs) 
                { 
                    knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage[i/2] += Math.Sqrt( 
                        Math.Pow(masterTrajectoryProfile[i] - input[i], 2) + 
                        Math.Pow(masterTrajectoryProfile[i + 1] - input[i + 1], 
                            2) 
                        ); 
                } 
            } 
            return knownInputsDissimilarityForAverage; 
        } 
 
        private static double GetDissimilarity( 
            IReadOnlyList<double> masterTrajectoryProfile, 
            double[] localInput) 
        { 
            var dissimilarityLocal = 0d; 
            var length = localInput.Count(); 
            for (var j = 0; j < length; j += 2) 
            { 
                dissimilarityLocal += 
                    Math.Sqrt( 
                        Math.Pow(masterTrajectoryProfile[j] - localInput[j], 2) + 
                        Math.Pow( 
                            masterTrajectoryProfile[j + 1] - localInput[j + 1], 
                            2)); 
            } 
            return dissimilarityLocal; 
        } 
 
        public static double[] CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile( 
            double[][] knownInputs, 
            int length) 
        { 
            var masterTrajectoryProfile = new double[length]; 
 
            var knownInputCount = knownInputs.Count(); 
            for (var i = 0; i < length; i++) 
            { 
                var sum = 0d; 
                for (var j = 0; j < knownInputCount; j++) 
                { 
                    sum += knownInputs[j][i]; 
                } 
                masterTrajectoryProfile[i] = sum/knownInputCount; 
            } 
            return masterTrajectoryProfile; 
        }}}  
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K Common Experiment Variables and Functions 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
 
namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications 
{ 
    public static class Constants 
    { 
        public static readonly double[] One = { 112d, 0d, 144d, -32d, 408d, 312d, 144d, 40d, 
192d, 88d }; 
        public static readonly double[] Two = { 96d, 0d, 184d, 87d, 456d, 376d, 152d, 56d, 
168d, 96d }; 
        public static readonly double[] Three = { 152d, 0d, 191d, -87d, 393d, 304d, 143d, 40d, 
193d, 89d }; 
        public static readonly double[] Four = { 87d, 0d, 337d, 225d, 353d, 272d, 151d, 46d, 
183d, 64d }; 
        public static readonly double[] Five = { 121d, 0d, 144d, 32d, 311d, 231d, 153d, 48d, 
187d, 88d }; 
        public static readonly double[] Six = { 112d, 0d, 144d, -32d, 408d, 312d, 144d, 40d, 
192d, 88d }; 
 
        public static readonly double[] Fake = { 112d, 0d, 168d, -48d, 104d, 24d, 168d, 55d, 
136d, 56d }; 
        public static readonly double[] Real = { 152.00d, 0.00d, 184.00d, -72.00d, 368.00d, 
296.00d, 152.00d, 49.00d, 137.00d, 41.00d }; 
        public static readonly double[] No = { 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d, 0d }; 
 
        public static double[][] Inputs() 
        { 
            return new[] 
            { 
                One, 
                Two, 
                Three, 
                Four, 
                Five, 
                Six, 
                Fake 
            }; 
        } 
 
        public static double[][] InputsNoFake() 
        { 
            return new[] 
            { 
                One, 
                Two, 
                Three, 
                Four, 
                Five, 
                Six 
            }; 
        }  
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        public static double[][] GoodInputs() 
        { 
            return new[] 
            { 
                One, 
                Two, 
                Three, 
                Five, 
                Six 
            }; 
        } 
        public static double[][] OutputsDouble() 
        { 
            var output = 
                new List<double[]>(new[] 
                { 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 0 } 
                }); 
 
            return output.ToArray(); 
        } 
 
        public static double[][] OutputsDoubleNoFake() 
        { 
            var output = 
                new List<double[]>(new[] 
                { 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 } 
                }); 
 
            return output.ToArray(); 
        } 
 
        public static double[][] GoodOutputs() 
        { 
            var output = 
                new List<double[]>(new[] 
                { 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 } 
                }); 
 
            return output.ToArray(); 
        } 
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        public static int[] GoodOutputsInt() 
        { 
            return new[] { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; 
        } 
        public static int[] OutputsInt() 
        { 
            return new[] { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 }; 
        } 
 
        public static int[] OutputsIntNoFake() 
        { 
            return new[] { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; 
        } 
 
        public static double[][] GenerateBadData(int cells, int rows, double max) 
        { 
            var random = new Random(); 
            return 
                Enumerable.Range(0, rows) 
                    .Select( 
                        x => 
                            Enumerable.Range(0, cells) 
                                .Select( 
                                    y => 
                                        (y == 1) ? 0 : 
                                        (y % 2 == 1 
                                        ? (random.NextDouble() > .5d 
                                            ? -1 
                                            : 1) 
                                        : 1) * 
                                        random.NextDouble() * max) 
                                .ToArray()) 
                    .ToArray(); 
        } 
 
        public static int[][] GenerateBadData(int cells, int rows, int max) 
        { 
            var random = new Random(); 
            return 
                Enumerable.Range(0, rows) 
                    .Select( 
                        x => 
                            Enumerable.Range(0, cells) 
                                .Select( 
                                    y => 
                                        (y == 1) ? 0 : 
                                        (y % 2 == 1 
                                        ? (random.NextDouble() > .5d 
                                            ? -1 
                                            : 1) 
                                        : 1) * 
                                        random.Next(max)) 
                                .ToArray()) 
                    .ToArray(); 
        } 
    } 
}  
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L Backpropagation Test 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting; 
using Thesis.Data.Classifiers; 
 
namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications 
{ 
    [TestClass] 
    public class BackPropagationClassifiers 
    { 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanTrain() 
        { 
            var p = new Backpropagation(); 
            var arr = new List<double[]> 
            { 
                Constants.One, 
                Constants.Two, 
                Constants.Three, 
                Constants.Four, 
                Constants.Five, 
                Constants.Six, 
                Constants.Fake, 
                Constants.Real 
            }; 
            arr.AddRange(Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 1000, 500d)); 
 
            var output = 
                new List<double[]>(new[] 
                { 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 }, 
                    new double[] { 0 }, 
                    new double[] { 1 } 
                }); 
            Enumerable.Range(0, 1000).ToList() 
                .ForEach(x => output.Add(new double[] { 0 })); 
 
            p.BackPropogationTrain(arr.ToArray(), output.ToArray(), 1000); 
            var check1 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.One)[0]; 
            var check2 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Two)[0]; 
            var check3 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Three)[0]; 
            var check4 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Four)[0]; 
            var check5 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Five)[0]; 
            var check6 = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Six)[0]; 
            var realCheck = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Real)[0]; 
            var fakeCheck = p.Network.Compute(Constants.Fake)[0]; 
            var noCheck = p.Network.Compute(Constants.No)[0]; 
        } 
    } 
} 
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M Support Vector Machine Tests 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting; 
using Thesis.Data.Classifiers; 
 
namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications 
{ 
    [TestClass] 
    public class SupportVectorMachineTest 
    { 
        private readonly KernelSupportVectorMachines _svm; 
        private int _falseRejections; 
        private int _max; 
        private int _min; 
        private readonly List<int> _numberOfFalseAcceptances; 
 
        public SupportVectorMachineTest() 
        { 
            _svm = new KernelSupportVectorMachines(); 
            _numberOfFalseAcceptances = new List<int>(); 
        } 
 
        public TestContext TestContext { get; set; } 
 
        private void CanTrain(int numberOfRandoms = 0, int iterations = 1000) 
        { 
            for (var i = 0; i < iterations; i++) 
            { 
                Train(numberOfRandoms); 
            } 
            TestContext.WriteLine( 
                "{0} - {1}.False Rejections: {2}. Avg False Acceptance: {3}. Total FAs: {4}", 
                _min, 
                _max, 
                _falseRejections, 
                _numberOfFalseAcceptances.Average(), 
                _numberOfFalseAcceptances.Sum()); 
        } 
 
        public void Train(int numberOfRandoms = 0) 
        { 
            var p = _svm; 
            var inputs = Constants.Inputs().ToList(); 
            var randoms = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, numberOfRandoms, 500); 
 
            var outputs = Constants.OutputsInt().ToList(); 
            outputs.AddRange(randoms.Select(x => 0)); 
 
            var toClassify = new List<double[]> 
            { 
                Constants.Real, 
                Constants.Fake, 
                Constants.No 
            }; 
            toClassify.AddRange(inputs);  
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            inputs.AddRange(randoms.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray())); 
            var err = p.Train(inputs.ToArray(), outputs.ToArray()); 
            var falseGen = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 10000, 500) 
                    .Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray()); 
            var errors = p.Classify(falseGen.ToArray()).ToList(); 
            var errors2 = p.Classify(toClassify.ToArray()).ToList(); 
 
            var errCount = errors.Count(x => x >= 0); 
 
            _max = Math.Max(_max, errCount); 
            _min = Math.Min(_min, errCount); 
 
            _numberOfFalseAcceptances.Add(errCount); 
 
            var falseRejections = errors2.Count(x => x >= 0); 
            if (falseRejections != 7) 
            { 
                _falseRejections++; 
            } 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanTrainNoRandoms() 
        { 
            CanTrain(0); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanTrain10Randoms() 
        { 
            CanTrain(10); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanTrain100Randoms() 
        { 
            CanTrain(100); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanTrain1000Randoms() 
        { 
            CanTrain(1000); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanTrain5000Randoms() 
        { 
            CanTrain(5000); 
        } 
    } 
} 
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N Decision Tree Tests 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Linq; 
using Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting; 
using Thesis.Data.Classifiers; 
 
namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications 
{ 
    [TestClass] 
    public class DecisionTreeTest 
    { 
        private readonly List<int> _numberOfFalseAcceptances; 
 
        private int _falseRejections; 
        private int totalComparisons; 
 
        private int _max; 
 
        private int _min = int.MaxValue; 
 
        public DecisionTreeTest() 
        { 
            _numberOfFalseAcceptances = new List<int>(); 
        } 
 
        public TestContext TestContext { get; set; } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanTrain() 
        { 
            var p = new DecisionTreeClassifier(); 
            var inputs = Constants.Inputs(); 
            var outputs = Constants.OutputsInt(); 
            var toClassify = new List<double[]> 
            { 
                Constants.Real, 
                Constants.Fake, 
                Constants.No 
            }; 
            toClassify.AddRange(inputs); 
            p.Train(inputs, outputs); 
            p.Classify(toClassify.ToArray()); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanClassify() 
        { 
            var p = new DecisionTreeClassifier(); 
            var inputs = Constants.Inputs().ToList(); 
            var randoms = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 10, 500); 
            inputs.AddRange( 
                randoms.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray())); 
 
            var outputs = Constants.OutputsInt().ToList(); 
            outputs.AddRange(randoms.Select(x => 0));  
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            p.Train(inputs.ToArray(), outputs.ToArray()); 
 
            var falseGen = 
                Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 10000, 500) 
                    .Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray()); 
            p.Classify(falseGen.ToArray()); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanClassifyWithRandoms(int numberOfRandoms) 
        { 
            var p = new DecisionTreeClassifier(); 
            var inputs = Constants.Inputs().ToList(); 
            var randoms = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, numberOfRandoms, 500); 
 
            var outputs = Constants.OutputsInt().ToList(); 
            outputs.AddRange(randoms.Select(x => 0)); 
 
            var toClassify = new List<double[]> 
            { 
                Constants.Real, 
                Constants.Fake, 
                Constants.No 
            }; 
            toClassify.AddRange(inputs); 
 
            inputs.AddRange( 
                randoms.Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray())); 
            p.Train(inputs.ToArray(), outputs.ToArray()); 
 
            var falseGen = 
                Constants.GenerateBadData(10, 10000, 500) 
                    .Select(nums => nums.Select(y => (double) y).ToArray()); 
            var errors = p.Classify(falseGen.ToArray()); 
            var errors2 = p.Classify(toClassify.ToArray()); 
 
            var errCount = errors.Count(x => x == 1); 
 
            _max = Math.Max(_max, errCount); 
            _min = Math.Min(_min, errCount); 
 
            _numberOfFalseAcceptances.Add(errCount); 
 
            totalComparisons += falseGen.Count() + inputs.Count(); 
 
            var falseRejections = errors2.Count(x => x == 1); 
            if (falseRejections != 7) 
            { 
                _falseRejections++; 
            } 
        } 
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        private void LoopGeneratedTests(int iterations, int numberOfRandoms) 
        { 
            for (var i = 0; i < iterations; i++) 
            { 
                CanClassifyWithRandoms(numberOfRandoms); 
            } 
            TestContext.WriteLine( 
                "{0} - {1} of {5}. False Rejections: {2}. Avg False Acceptance: {3}. 
False Acceptances: {4}", 
                _min, 
                _max, 
                _falseRejections, 
                _numberOfFalseAcceptances.Average(), 
                _numberOfFalseAcceptances.Sum(), 
                totalComparisons); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void LoopGeneratedTestsNoRandoms() 
        { 
            LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 0); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void LoopGeneratedTests10Randoms() 
        { 
            LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 10); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void LoopGeneratedTests100Randoms() 
        { 
            LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 100); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void LoopGeneratedTests1000Randoms() 
        { 
            LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 1000); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void LoopGeneratedTests5000Randoms() 
        { 
            LoopGeneratedTests(1000, 5000); 
        } 
    } 
} 
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O Dissimilarity Comparison Tests 
using System; 
using System.Linq; 
using Microsoft.VisualStudio.TestTools.UnitTesting; 
using Thesis.Data.Classifiers; 
using Accord.Statistics; 
using Thesis.Data.ReadFiles; 
 
namespace Thesis.Tests.Classifications 
{ 
    [TestClass] 
    public class DissimilarityTest 
    { 
        int _numberOfFalseAcceptances; 
        int _numberOfFalseRejections; 
 
        public TestContext TestContext { get; set; } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void CanDetermineDissimilarity() 
        { 
            var fake =  
DissimilarityComparison.AuthenticateUser(Constants.InputsNoFake(), Constants.Fake, 1d); 
            var real =  
DissimilarityComparison.AuthenticateUser(Constants.InputsNoFake(), Constants.Real, 1d); 
            var no =    
DissimilarityComparison.AuthenticateUser(Constants.InputsNoFake(), Constants.No, 1d); 
            Assert.IsTrue(real); 
            Assert.IsFalse(fake); 
            Assert.IsFalse(no); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void DissimilarityForRandoms() 
        { 
            var numberOfProfiles = 1000000; 
            var knownInputs = Constants.GoodInputs(); 
            var length = knownInputs[0].Count(); 
            var masterTrajectoryProfile = 
DissimilarityComparison.CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(knownInputs, length); 
            var dissimilarityProfile = 
DissimilarityComparison.GetDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, masterTrajectoryProfile, 
length); 
            var sigma = 1d; 
            var knownAverageDissimilarity = dissimilarityProfile.Average(); 
            var knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity = 
dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation(); 
 
            foreach (var known in knownInputs) 
            { 
                Assert.IsTrue(DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid( 
                    masterTrajectoryProfile,  
                    known,  
                    knownAverageDissimilarity,  
                    knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,  
                    sigma)); 
            }  
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            Assert.IsTrue( 
                DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid( 
                    masterTrajectoryProfile, 
                    Constants.Real, 
                    knownAverageDissimilarity, 
                    knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
                    sigma)); 
            Assert.IsFalse( 
                DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid( 
                    masterTrajectoryProfile, 
                    Constants.Fake, 
                    knownAverageDissimilarity, 
                    knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
                    sigma)); 
            Assert.IsFalse( 
                DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid( 
                    masterTrajectoryProfile, 
                    Constants.No, 
                    knownAverageDissimilarity, 
                    knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
                    sigma)); 
 
            RunAgainstInputs(masterTrajectoryProfile,  
                knownAverageDissimilarity,  
                knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity,  
                sigma,  
                numberOfProfiles); 
            TestContext.WriteLine("False Acceptances: {0}.  FAR: {1}%",  
                _numberOfFalseAcceptances,  
                ((_numberOfFalseAcceptances / (double)numberOfProfiles) * 100)); 
        } 
 
        private void RunAgainstInputs( 
            double[] masterTrajectoryProfile, 
            double knownAverageDissimilarity, 
            double knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
            double sigma, 
            int numberOfProfiles) 
        { 
            var dataToTest = Constants.GenerateBadData(10, numberOfProfiles, 250d); 
            var datas = dataToTest.Take(10).Select(x => string.Join(", ", x.Select(y => 
(y/1).ToString()))); 
             
            for (var i = 0; i < numberOfProfiles; i++) 
            { 
                if ( 
                    DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid( 
                        masterTrajectoryProfile, 
                        dataToTest[i], 
                        knownAverageDissimilarity, 
                        knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
                        sigma) 
                    ) 
                { 
                    _numberOfFalseAcceptances++; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
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        [TestMethod] 
        public void DissimilarityForRandomsLoop() 
        { 
            var numberOfProfiles = 1000000; 
            var knownInputs = Constants.GoodInputs(); 
            var length = knownInputs[0].Count(); 
            var masterTrajectoryProfile = 
DissimilarityComparison.CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(knownInputs, length); 
            var dissimilarityProfile = 
DissimilarityComparison.GetDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, masterTrajectoryProfile, length); 
            var sigma = 1d; 
            var knownAverageDissimilarity = dissimilarityProfile.Average(); 
            var knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity = 
dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation(); 
 
            for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) 
            { 
                RunAgainstInputs(masterTrajectoryProfile, knownAverageDissimilarity, 
knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, sigma, numberOfProfiles); 
            } 
            TestContext.WriteLine("False Acceptances: {0}.  FAR: {1}%", 
_numberOfFalseAcceptances, ((_numberOfFalseAcceptances / (double)numberOfProfiles) * 100)); 
        } 
 
        [TestMethod] 
        public void TestFile() 
        { 
            var items = 
                CMUData.ReadFromFileData( 
                    CSVReader.ReadFile(@"DSL-StrongPasswordData.csv")); 
            var inputGroups = items.GroupBy(x => new { x.Person, x.SessionIndex }); 
            var length = 20; 
            TestContext.WriteLine("Person,Session,FalseAcceptances,FAR,FalseRejections,FRR"); 
            foreach (var inputGroup in inputGroups) 
            { 
                var localFalseAcceptance = 0; 
                var localFalseRejection = 0; 
                var knownInputs = inputGroup.Select(x => x.Data).Skip(45).ToArray(); 
                var userInputs = inputGroup.Select(x => x.Data).Take(45).ToArray(); 
                var masterTrajectoryProfile = 
DissimilarityComparison.CreateMasterTrajectoryProfile(knownInputs, length); 
                var dissimilarityProfile = 
DissimilarityComparison.GetDissimilarityProfile(knownInputs, masterTrajectoryProfile, length); 
                var sigma = 2d; 
                var knownAverageDissimilarity = dissimilarityProfile.Average(); 
                var knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity = 
dissimilarityProfile.StandardDeviation(); 
 
                var notCurrentPerson = inputGroups.Where(x => x.Key.Person != 
inputGroup.Key.Person); 
                var dataToTest = notCurrentPerson.SelectMany(x => x).Select(x => 
x.Data).ToArray(); 
                var numberOfProfiles = dataToTest.Length; 
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                for (var i = 0; i < numberOfProfiles; i++) 
                { 
                    if ( 
                        DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid( 
                            masterTrajectoryProfile, 
                            dataToTest[i], 
                            knownAverageDissimilarity, 
                            knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
                            sigma) 
                        ) 
                    { 
                        localFalseAcceptance++; 
                        _numberOfFalseAcceptances++; 
                    } 
                } 
 
                for (var i = 0; i < 45; i++) 
                { 
                    if ( 
                        DissimilarityComparison.IsProfileValid( 
                            masterTrajectoryProfile, 
                            userInputs[i], 
                            knownAverageDissimilarity, 
                            knownStandardDeviationDissimilarity, 
                            sigma) 
                        ) 
                    { 
                        localFalseRejection++; 
                        _numberOfFalseRejections++; 
                    } 
                } 
                TestContext.WriteLine("{0},{1},{2},{3},{4},{5}",  
                    inputGroup.Key.Person,  
                    inputGroup.Key.SessionIndex,  
                    localFalseAcceptance,  
                    (Convert.ToDouble(localFalseAcceptance) / numberOfProfiles) * 100,  
                    localFalseRejection,  
                    (Convert.ToDouble(localFalseRejection) / 45) * 100); 
            } 
             
        } 
    } 
}  
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P Database Script 
USE [Thesis] 
GO 
/****** Object:  Table [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts]    Script Date: 2/17/2016 
10:11:45 PM ******/ 
SET ANSI_NULLS ON 
GO 
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON 
GO 
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts]( 
 [Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL, 
 [Saved] [datetime] NOT NULL, 
 [IpAddress] [nvarchar](max) NULL, 
 [Referrer] [nvarchar](max) NULL, 
 [Url] [nvarchar](max) NULL, 
 [RequestType] [int] NOT NULL, 
 [FormInteraction_Id] [int] NULL, 
 [DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'), 
 [SignInStatus] [int] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)), 
 CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED  
( 
 [Id] ASC 
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF, 
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY] 
) ON [PRIMARY] TEXTIMAGE_ON [PRIMARY] 
 
GO 
/****** Object:  Table [dbo].[FormInfo]    Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM ******/ 
SET ANSI_NULLS ON 
GO 
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON 
GO 
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[FormInfo]( 
 [Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL, 
 [Name] [nvarchar](max) NULL, 
 [Value] [nvarchar](max) NULL, 
 [ApplicationRequestContext_Id] [int] NULL, 
 [DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'), 
 CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.FormInfo] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED  
( 
 [Id] ASC 
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF, 
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY] 
) ON [PRIMARY] TEXTIMAGE_ON [PRIMARY] 
 
GO/****** Object:  Table [dbo].[FormInteractions]    Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM 
******/ 
SET ANSI_NULLS ON 
GO 
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON 
GO 
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[FormInteractions]( 
 [Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL, 
 [DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'), 
 CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.FormInteractions] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED  
(  
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 [Id] ASC 
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF, 
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY] 
) ON [PRIMARY] 
 
GO 
/****** Object:  Table [dbo].[KeyboardInteractions]    Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM 
******/ 
SET ANSI_NULLS ON 
GO 
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON 
GO 
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[KeyboardInteractions]( 
 [Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL, 
 [KeyPressed] [int] NOT NULL, 
 [FormInteraction_Id] [int] NULL, 
 [ElementName] [nvarchar](10) NOT NULL, 
 [AltPressed] [bit] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)), 
 [CtrlPressed] [bit] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)), 
 [ShiftPressed] [bit] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)), 
 [DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'), 
 [TimeReleased] [decimal](18, 2) NULL DEFAULT ((0)), 
 [TimePressed] [decimal](18, 2) NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)), 
 CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.KeyboardInteractions] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED  
( 
 [Id] ASC 
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF, 
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY] 
) ON [PRIMARY] 
 
GO 
/****** Object:  Table [dbo].[MouseInteractions]    Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM 
******/ 
SET ANSI_NULLS ON 
GO 
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON 
GO 
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[MouseInteractions]( 
 [Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL, 
 [TimePressed] [datetime] NOT NULL, 
 [MouseX] [int] NOT NULL, 
 [MouseY] [int] NOT NULL, 
 [FormInteraction_Id] [int] NULL, 
 [Button] [int] NOT NULL DEFAULT ((0)), 
 [ElementName] [nvarchar](10) NOT NULL, 
 [DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'), 
 CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.MouseInteractions] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED  
( 
 [Id] ASC 
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF, 
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY] 
) ON [PRIMARY] 
 
GO 
/****** Object:  Table [dbo].[RequestHeaders]    Script Date: 2/17/2016 10:11:45 PM 
******/ 
SET ANSI_NULLS ON 
GO  
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SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER ON 
GO 
CREATE TABLE [dbo].[RequestHeaders]( 
 [Id] [int] IDENTITY(1,1) NOT NULL, 
 [Name] [nvarchar](max) NULL, 
 [Value] [nvarchar](max) NULL, 
 [ApplicationRequestContext_Id] [int] NULL, 
 [DateCreated] [datetime] NULL DEFAULT ('1900-01-01T00:00:00.000'), 
 CONSTRAINT [PK_dbo.RequestHeaders] PRIMARY KEY CLUSTERED  
( 
 [Id] ASC 
)WITH (PAD_INDEX = OFF, STATISTICS_NORECOMPUTE = OFF, IGNORE_DUP_KEY = OFF, 
ALLOW_ROW_LOCKS = ON, ALLOW_PAGE_LOCKS = ON) ON [PRIMARY] 
) ON [PRIMARY] TEXTIMAGE_ON [PRIMARY] 
 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts]  WITH CHECK ADD  CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] FOREIGN 
KEY([FormInteraction_Id]) 
REFERENCES [dbo].[FormInteractions] ([Id]) 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts] CHECK CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[FormInfo]  WITH CHECK ADD  CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.FormInfo_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_ApplicationRequestContext_Id] FOREIGN 
KEY([ApplicationRequestContext_Id]) 
REFERENCES [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts] ([Id]) 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[FormInfo] CHECK CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.FormInfo_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_ApplicationRequestContext_Id] 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[KeyboardInteractions]  WITH CHECK ADD  CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.KeyboardInteractions_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] FOREIGN 
KEY([FormInteraction_Id]) 
REFERENCES [dbo].[FormInteractions] ([Id]) 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[KeyboardInteractions] CHECK CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.KeyboardInteractions_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[MouseInteractions]  WITH CHECK ADD  CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.MouseInteractions_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] FOREIGN 
KEY([FormInteraction_Id]) 
REFERENCES [dbo].[FormInteractions] ([Id]) 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[MouseInteractions] CHECK CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.MouseInteractions_dbo.FormInteractions_FormInteraction_Id] 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[RequestHeaders]  WITH CHECK ADD  CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.RequestHeaders_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_ApplicationRequestContext_Id] 
FOREIGN KEY([ApplicationRequestContext_Id]) 
REFERENCES [dbo].[ApplicationRequestContexts] ([Id]) 
GO 
ALTER TABLE [dbo].[RequestHeaders] CHECK CONSTRAINT 
[FK_dbo.RequestHeaders_dbo.ApplicationRequestContexts_ApplicationRequestContext_Id] 
GO  
 
